

Evaluation of OASD/SA Study
The War in Cambodia
May 1971

14 May 71 Report, Military Assessment in Cambodia, prepared
in the Department of Defense (OASD/SA)

17 May 71 Report, The War in Cambodia, prepared in the Department
of Defense (OASD/SA)

21 May 71 [] to ACh/D/I memo re Comments on OASD Draft
Report, The War in Cambodia, 17 May 1971, Secret

21 May 71 [] to ACh/D/I memo re Evaluation of OASD/SA Study,
The War in Cambodia

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OSD review(s) completed.

21 May 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, D/I

SUBJECT : Evaluation of OASD/SA Study, The War In Cambodia

1. The OASD/SA study makes a unique and strong contribution to our knowledge of the war in Cambodia by providing a comprehensive data base capable of lending substance to assessments of the changing nature and quality of the military action. For the most part, the questionable consistency and accuracy of the individual data inputs are adequately recognized and the statistical analyses are hedged accordingly. Although the paper is marred by some inconsistencies in numerical data, as well as a few questionable conclusions, it nevertheless is a very useful study.

2. With that caveat, we note the following:

a. The statement in the last paragraph of Page 16 that FANK cut Communist forces off from the port of Sihanoukville in our view overstates both enemy intentions and FANK capabilities.

b. We also think that the possibility of "local accommodation between FANK and the enemy" is overemphasized (in Paragraph 3 of Page 7). Also, the suggestion (in the cited paragraph and also in Paragraph 1, Page 32) that the enemy has been "trying to disengage" in MR-4 is contradicted by the recent increase in enemy attacks there.

c. On Page 14, the comparison of FANK with RF/PF in RVN should be caveated to reflect the more extensive Allied air and artillery support available to the ARVN.

d. In view of subsequent analysis, the statement (on Page 20) that "FANK may fight better when near ARVN troops" does not seem appropriate. The conclusion reached from analysis of the December ARVN intervention is that "there is nothing in the data which suggests the ARVN intervention in December was paralleled by greater aggressiveness or higher combat performance on the part of FANK." This, coupled with the counter example in MR 2 alluded to on Page 23, would seem to outweigh the evidence of the February/March period. Moreover, there was much less FANK/ARVN interaction in February/March than in December. (Incidentally, the KIA data in Tables 11 and 12 are not consistent.)

e. There are minor numerical inconsistencies between data on combat actions presented in the last paragraph on Page 14 and in Tables 6 and 13. (Specifically, 1,597 vs. 1,598 and 1,560 vs. 1,563.) There

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is an additional discrepancy between these data and the statement in the last paragraph on Page 23 that there were 83 more combat actions in MR 2 than in MR 1 (1,597-1,560 = 37; 1,598-1,563 = 35).

f. As noted in the first draft, we still maintain that 8-10,000 FANK combat troops were involved in the Pich Nil operation of January 1971, rather than the 5,000 cited in the last paragraph on Page 25.

g. In our view, the regional strength ratios (cited in Page 30) become irrelevant when applied to specific operations.

h. The strength ratio for the PPSMR (Page 36) is not comparable with that of other MR's since it includes a "fat" concentration headquarters troops and is also a center for R & R and logistic activity. Conversely, most of the enemy strength "threatening" Phnom Penh is outside of the PPSMR.

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Command and Control. Command and control problems in FANK are generated by communications and transportation systems primitive by South Vietnamese standards, and by a tradition of regional autonomy. In a very real sense, the FANK Headquarters is cut off from direct control of forces outside of Phnom Penh Special Military Region and seldom commands in the full sense of the term. The fact that the regional commands respond to the extent they do attests not only to the network of personal loyalty which extends from Lon Nol downward -- which his subordinates have played upon in the premier's absence -- but to the almost fanatical commitment to the common cause of ridding Cambodia of Vietnamese.

Centralized control is increasing. The creation and activity of FANK's "intervention forces"--those units controlled directly by Headquarters--the revision of administrative procedures (such as the military pay system), the compilation of personnel records and, perhaps most important of all, the monopoly the Headquarters has on the flow of arms, ammunition and supplies and trained personnel coming into the country, are all giving Phnom Penh greater control over the war it must wage. But these are phenomena which erode regional autonomy rather than replace it entirely, and it is likely to be at least a year before the Headquarters in Phnom Penh can exercise the kind of control over FANK that Saigon was able to exercise over ARVN as early as three years ago. In the meantime, command and control between Phnom Penh and the region must rely primarily upon ties of personal loyalty rather than institutionalized procedures.

One of the dangers in this arrangement is the possibility of local accommodation between FANK and the enemy in relatively isolated sections of the country. The data suggest this may already be occurring in GKR military region 4, where the tradition of regional autonomy and difficulty of communication may be combining to promote that development.

The Action

NOTE: The statistics discussed in this section are tenuous and from a reporting system that is still shaking down. We believe that the trends they show are probably about right, but the data and findings must be viewed with some caution for awhile yet.

Most assessments of the Cambodian situation foresaw increased activity as the dry season began in October 1970. There were several reasons for this expectation. Experience with the cyclical pattern of warfare in Vietnam, the increased size of FANK and the growing realization of how much the loss of Sihanoukville and the disruption of the Cambodian sanctuary had hurt the communists all contributed to the assumption that the war would escalate in the dry season.

Table 2 shows that the levels of activity in Cambodia, excluding any ARVN involvement, doubled between the third and fourth quarters of 1970 and have remained at the higher level ever since. The increase stemmed from an upsurge of enemy attacks by fire and contacts between FANK and enemy forces.

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TABLE 2:

ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA: FANK VS THE ENEMY a/
 (No ARVN Involvement) b/

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>FANK Actions</u>			
Ground Attacks	45	69	65
Ambushes	7	17	18
Other	2	8	10
Subtotal	54	94	93
<u>Enemy Actions</u>			
Ground Attacks	185	323	202
Attacks by fire/harassment	412	843	942
IOC Interdiction	94	141	89
Sabotage/Terror	40	43	57
Other	13	12	15
Subtotal	744 (6331) <u>c/</u>	1362 (4298)	1305 (4889)
<u>Contacts</u>	197	605	862
Total Combat Actions	995	2061	2260

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File from daily attache reports. For definition of each activity, see appendix. Actions reported as a "contact" are often ambiguous regarding the circumstances involved and, in particular, which side initiated the action. "Contacts" are defined by FANK as combat actions which occur outside FANK defensive positions, and, accordingly, many contacts are probably brought about by conscious FANK efforts to find and destroy enemy units. But, because "contacts" can also refer to actions in which FANK either was not seeking nor expecting combat activity, they have been dealt with as a separate category of activity.

b/ Does not include actions in which ARVN was reported as involved.

c/ Figures in parentheses indicate count of similar action in South Vietnam for same period. Source: OASD(C) Southeast Asia Statistical Summary.

While there was an upsurge in activity during the dry season, it is important to keep the figures in perspective; they are far below what has been occurring in South Vietnam for at least the last five years. The figures in parentheses, referring to comparable actions in South Vietnam, show that enemy activity in Cambodia, excluding actions against ARVN, has been about 22% of that recorded in South Vietnam during the same period. Even the highest monthly figure for enemy attacks by fire or harassing actions (about 376 in March 1971) is only about two-fifths of the lowest monthly figure recorded for similar actions in the RVN since 1965 (about 968 in November 1970).^{1/}

^{1/} Sources: Cambodian data: Khmer computer file; South Vietnam: SEA Statistical Summary.

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Enemy Patterns. The enemy appears to have moved toward greater reliance on standoff attacks as opposed to ground assaults. In absolute number, enemy ground attacks nearly doubled last fall, but returned to last summer's level this year. Because of the increase in attacks by fire, however, enemy ground attacks now constitute a smaller portion of total enemy activity than in 1970 (15% this year vs 25% in 1970). Attacks by fire and harassment have risen to about 72% of all enemy combat activity compared to about 60% last year (Table 2).

The shift in enemy activity has probably contributed to lower casualties on both sides during the first three months of 1971. While about 2295 FANK and 5409 enemy have been killed in action since July 1, 1970, exclusive of any ARVN involvement, almost half of this 7704 total occurred during the last three months of 1970. The enemy KIA figures for the first quarter of this year slipped below the level reported for last summer, while FANK deaths returned to the summer level.

In addition, there have been fewer casualties per action in 1971. FANK, for example, lost about 1.3 KIA per enemy ground attack in 1970; this year the loss per attack has been about 0.6. Likewise, the enemy KIA in ground attacks has dropped from about 3.3 to 1.9 KIA per attack. Thus, the drop in casualties in the face of high levels of activity appears due to both a shift in the mix of enemy activity and a reduction in intensity.

TABLE 3

COMBAT DEATHS IN CAMBODIA: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT a/

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>FANK KIA</u>			
In Enemy Actions b/	419	607	243
In FANK Actions c/	111	52	13
In Contacts	123	333	394
Subtotal	653	992	650
<u>Enemy KIA</u>			
In Enemy Actions b/	645	1215	291
In FANK Actions c/	442	258	149
In Contacts	442	1104	863
Subtotal	1529	2577	1303
Total KIA (FANK plus Enemy)	2182	3569	1953

a/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents with any ARVN involvement.

b/ Includes enemy ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire, harassment, LOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.

c/ Includes FANK ground attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire.

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FANK Patterns and Performance. FANK is clearly on the defensive. At least 64% of all actions reported since July 1970 have been attributed to enemy initiative (Table 2) and the overall pattern of activity clearly shows that the war is being fought along Phnom Penh's lifelines, not in the enemy base areas (see map plots). Nationally, about 80% of all reported actions have occurred on or within 5 kilometers of a major Cambodian LOC.

The percentage of actions which are clearly attributable to enemy initiative has declined over the last nine months, from 75% in the summer to 66% in the fall and 58% this year (Table 2). Likewise the circumstances of FANK deaths have changed. As Table 4 shows, there has been a definite shift in FANK KIA toward actions reported as "contacts."

These trends can be accounted for in two ways. They could be a result of changes in the reporting system; FANK may simply be reporting as contacts what they earlier would have reported as enemy attacks, etc. If this is the case, the data does not say FANK is getting better.

On the other hand, the shift toward "contacts" which appears both in the reports of activity and in the casualty data, may actually portray a greater willingness on the part of FANK to move out of defensive positions. If FANK is reporting honestly, and means what it defines as a "contact" (ie: a combat action that takes place outside FANK defensive positions), then the shift probably reflects greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The data in this case say that nine months ago 64% of FANK KIA were killed when FANK remained behind its own defenses, now 64% are dying when FANK has at least moved outside its own wire.

TABLE 4


CIRCUMSTANCES OF FANK KIA^{a/}

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
<u>During:</u>			
<u>FANK</u>			
Attacks	107	50	13
Ambushes	1	2	1
Other	3	0	1
Subtotal	111	52	15
<u>Enemy</u>			
Attacks	215	427	104
ABF/Harassment	92	122	68
Other	112	58	71
Subtotal	419	607	243
<u>Contacts</u>	123	333	409
<u>Total FANK KIA</u>	653	992	667

a/ Source: Khmer computer file from attache reports; data excludes incidents with ARVN involvement.

b/ During patrol.


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ACTION IN CAMBODIA - 4th QTR 1970

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
□ - Friendly initiated contact, attack, ambush
* - Enemy initiated attack, attack by fire, ambush, sabotage or terror

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ACTION IN CAMBODIA - 1st QTR 1971 (to 12 February)

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But the effectiveness of FANK, measured in terms of casualties inflicted on the enemy, is not impressive. In terms of total KIA figures, the enemy/FANK kill ratio has been maintained at about 2 to 1 for the past nine months. Table 5 shows that this is low--below the overall kill ratio achieved by RF/PF units in South Vietnam and only about half the ARVN record.

FANK ability to kill the enemy comes closest to the kill ratio associated with the RF and PF in Military Regions II and III of South Vietnam over the last three years; but these units are considered to be the worst in South Vietnam.^{1/} The ratio has been better when FANK takes the fight to the enemy, (ie: FANK attacks, ambushes, attacks by fire) and when the action takes place outside FANK defensive positions (ie: contacts) but in neither of these cases has FANK come close to the ARVN record in similar categories.

TABLE 5

Enemy/FANK, ARVN, RF/PF	KILL RATIOS		
	3rd Qtr 1970	4th Qtr 1970	1st Qtr 1971 ¹
Enemy/FANK in Cambodia <u>a/</u>	2.3	2.6	2.0
(FANK Actions)	(3.0)	(4.8)	(4.8)
(Enemy Actions)	(1.5)	(2.0)	(1.2)
(Contacts)	(3.6)	(3.3)	(2.2)
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Enemy/ARVN in SVN <u>b/</u>	5.4	4.4	5.7
Enemy/RF-PF in SVN <u>b/</u>	3.6	3.8	2.0
(MR II)	(3.5)	(1.7)	(1.3)
(MR III)	(2.5)	(3.2)	(2.3)

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File.

b/ Source: SEER Computer File for ARVN; TFES for RF/PF.

Kill ratios are only one measure of combat effectiveness. But FANK is not very effective by other measures either. It has not, for example, expanded the territory it controls nor has it been able to expand the Cambodian government's (GKR) control over the population. There are probably more people in government controlled areas now than there were six months ago, but the increase has been due to an influx of refugees, not to an expansion of GKR controlled territory. (Thus, increases in the number of people in government controlled areas are a measure of enemy ineffectiveness rather than FANK combat ability.) And field assessments generally agree that while FANK is now performing better than it was six months ago, its combat proficiency remains low.

1/ SEA Analysis Report, November/December 1970.

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The War by Military Regions

The war differs in each of Cambodia's military regions, making generalizations difficult. Indeed, regional variation is probably more pronounced in Cambodia than in South Vietnam for a number of reasons.

-- Enemy strategy in Cambodia differs greatly depending upon locale, if only because a large part of Cambodia east of the Mekong is more intimately involved with the war in South Vietnam. It is possible that the enemy sees two major arenas in Cambodia. The first, and probably most important, is the general border area--a defensive arena so far as the enemy is concerned in which his primary antagonist is ARVN and the primary purpose is the maintenance of the southern terminus of the Laotian supply system. The second arena lies generally west of the Mekong. Here enemy activity is primarily devoted to the isolation of Phnom Penh from its internal sources of sustenance.

-- The participants vary from region to region. Both FANK and the enemy have operated in all of Cambodia's military regions, but ARVN, the war's third major participant, has not often operated west of the Mekong and never in GKR MRs 3 and 4.


-- In contrast to the situation in South Vietnam, Cambodian military regions are not held together by a centralized, institutionalized military establishment. Although efforts are underway to centralize, difficulties in communication combine with tradition to give regional commanders great autonomy. The character of the war in each region therefore necessarily reflects the personalities, aggressiveness and orientation of the men on the ground, resulting in the kind of regional variation South Vietnam knew perhaps 20 years ago.

Each of Cambodia's military regions is discussed below in the same general terms: (1) the intensity and character of the war, (2) the patterns and effectiveness of enemy units there, and (3) the effectiveness of FANK.

Military Region 1

- Actions and Casualties in MR 1. In absolute numbers, MR 1--north and east of Phnom Penh--most active of all MRs for four of the ten months surveyed, both in terms of combat actions and the production of casualties. More combat actions, exclusive of any ARVN involvement, have occurred here than in any other MR (1597 compared to 1560 in MR 2, the nearest rival), and about 34% of all FANK casualties since July have been reported from MR 1 (Table 6).

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TABLE 6

ACTIONS IN MR 1: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	51	175	241
Enemy Actions a/	219	509	331
FANK Actions b/	21	31	20
Total	<u>291</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>592</u>
Enemy Actions as % of Total	75	71	56

a/ Includes attacks, ABF, LOC interdiction, sabotage, terror.

b/ Includes attacks, ambushes.

Source: Khmer computer file from attache cable.

The enemy has initiated most of the combat activity each month for the past nine months but as Table 7 indicates, the activity has gradually moved away from situations in which FANK was clearly in a tactical defensive posture.

Casualties on both sides paralleled the pattern of activity until this year, when they fell closer to the lower levels of the rainy season. This decrease, portrayed in Table 9, reflects the enemy shift toward a greater reliance on standoff attacks.

TABLE 7

CASUALTIES IN MR 1: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	12	118	124
In Enemy Actions	141	351	76
In FANK Actions	19	22	4
Subtotal	<u>172</u>	<u>491</u>	<u>204</u>
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	55	349	260
In Enemy Actions	145	799	189
In FANK Actions	18	71	16
Subtotal	<u>218</u>	<u>1219</u>	<u>465</u>
Total KIA	390	1710	669
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.3	2.5	2.3

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- Enemy Activity in MR 1. Enemy activity in MR 1 surged last fall but returned this year to a level much closer to the rainy season level last summer. The mix of enemy activity in MR 1 indicates a greater reliance on attacks by fire than anywhere else in Cambodia. As Table 8 indicates, the enemy launched about six attacks by fire for every ground assault in the 3rd quarter 1970. This ratio dropped to about 4 to 1 in the upsurge of enemy activity during the last three months in 1970, but has increased to about nine attacks by fire for each ground attack this year.

TABLE 8

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 1

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	28	92	30
ABF/Harassment	159	384	262
LOC Interdiction	21	24	25
Sabotage/Terror	5	7	14
Other	6	2	8
Total	<u>219</u>	<u>509</u>	<u>339</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	5.6	4.2	8.7

-- FANK Patterns and Performance. Table 9 shows FANK strength in MR 1 for four of the last nine months. The FANK-Enemy strength ratio in MR 1 is the worst in the country, but the presence of ARVN compensates for the relatively poor ratio.

TABLE 9

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u> <u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>MR 1</u>				
Combat	27.0	34.6	33.2	38.0
Support	2.3	2.3	2.6	4.2
Total	<u>29.3</u>	<u>36.9</u>	<u>35.8</u>	<u>42.2</u>

MR 1 was the site of the first FANK effort to launch a large scale clearing operation against enemy forces, at that time threatening Kampong Thom. Chen La, as the three month operation was termed, involved 23,000 FANK troops, but bogged down shortly after being launched on 7 September. Troops associated with the operation ultimately required ARVN assistance to break out of holding positions along route 7.

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By most accounts, Chen La showed that FANK had to improve considerably before it could seriously challenge enemy units in MR 1. Most assessments of the operation identified inexperience and leadership deficiencies as the primary problems.

But the attention given FANK difficulties in Chen La may have obscured other facts. FANK units in MR 1 have, for example, a comparatively good enemy/FANK kill ratio. (Return to Table 7.) It remains low compared to the ARVN record in Vietnam (about 2 to 1 compared with the ARVN record of about 6 to 1 over the last three years), but was one of the best in Cambodia this year. (The kill ratio was slightly higher in MR 3, but at a lower absolute level.)

The number of enemy killed per 1000 FANK combat strength has also been impressive compared to other areas of Cambodia. As Table 10 indicates, FANK was killing only about 3 enemy a month for each 1000 FANK combat troops stationed in MR 1 last summer. In the fourth quarter of the year this ratio jumped to 8.8 per month, still only about a third of the ARVN level in South Vietnam (second half 1970) and about half that achieved by ARVN units in GVN MR II (considered poor), but the best ever achieved by the Cambodian Army. The 4.6 level attained in 1971 was, again, the highest in Cambodia. 1/

TABLE 10

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH IN MR 1
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 a/			
Enemy KIA	73	306	155
FANK Strength (000)	27.0	34.6	33.2
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.7	8.8	4.6
	<u>2nd Half 69</u>	<u>1st Half 70</u>	<u>2nd Half 70</u>
ARVN vs Enemy in RVN b/			
(KIA/1000/Strength)	19	41	25
(in MR II)	(17)	(23)	(17)
(in MR III)	(14)	(34)	(17)

a/ Source: Khmer Computer File (excluding all actions with ARVN involvement).

b/ Source: SEER Computer File; record of ARVN units in RVN MR II and III, considered to be worst in ARVN (See SEA Analysis Report, Nov-Dec 1970), included for comparative purposes.

1/ But was far below what has been reported for the ARVN units operating in GKR MR 1. During February 1971, about 18,000 ARVN, involved in operation Toan Thang killed nearly 2200 enemy, for a kill ratio of about 125 per 1000 combat strength. In March, the ARVN kill ratio for Toan Thang rose to about 135 per 1000 combat strength. (Based on NMCC reports of 1 March and 2 April 1971.)

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The improved FANK performance implied by the 8.8:ratio during the last three months of 1970 reflects the output of the Chen La operation. It suggests that FANK can perform more effectively when it tries--although it is still unimpressive when compared to the ARVN.

The high kill ratio also suggests that FANK may fight better when near ARVN. ARVN has, after all, operated extensively in GKR MR 1 since the cross border operations last year, and on two occasions--the relief of FANK forces on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thang--has engaged the enemy in the vicinity of the major concentration of FANK forces in MR 1 (the general Kampong Cham area).

To test this hypothesis, we isolated two periods of ARVN involvement in Cambodia and looked closely at the effect ARVN had on the FANK-enemy relationship in the general area of ARVN operations (see map 2: The ARVN relief operation on Route 7 and Operation Toan Thang). We found ARVN operations had significant impact on the enemy tactics adopted vis-a-vis FANK, and that recent ARVN operations have been paralleled by higher combat performance on the part of FANK units in the same general area.

Table 11 shows combat activity involving the enemy and FANK peaked shortly before the ARVN relief force arrived in Kampong Cham on December 15. It also demonstrates how the enemy disengaged from contact with FANK as the ARVN clearing operation pushed along Route 7 toward Prey Totung. No ground attacks were launched against FANK positions and standoff attacks dropped to about half the level recorded during the two weeks just before the ARVN intervention. As the enemy disengaged, however, FANK remained inside their defensive positions.^{1/} The result was a drop in both enemy and FANK casualties. There is nothing in the data which suggests the ARVN intervention in December was paralleled by greater aggressiveness or higher combat performance on the part of FANK.

^{1/} Perhaps because of the heavy losses taken just before ARVN entered the picture.


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MAP 2

THE ARVN-ENEMY-FANK RELATIONSHIP: AREA INVESTIGATED



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TABLE 11

FANK-ENEMY INTERACTION NEAR ARVN*
(Weekly Average)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1-15</u>	<u>ARVN</u> <u>Present</u> <u>15-31</u> <u>Dec^{a/}</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>ARVN Present</u>	
	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb^{b/}</u>	<u>Mar^{b/}</u>
Enemy Activity							
Ground Attacks	2	11	5	0	0.3	1	1
ABF/Harassment	6	8	12	5	3	5	7
FANK Attacks	1	2	1	1	0	1	6
Other Contacts	3	7	10	7	6	6	6
Enemy killed by FANK	22	54	186	30	10	39	57
FANK killed by Enemy	9	39	87	13	5	6	17
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	(2.4)	(1.4)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(2.0)	(6.5)	(3.4)

* Data includes incidents involving only FANK and Enemy Forces.

^{a/} Period of ARVN relief operation on Route 7.^{b/} Period of ARVN Toan Thang 1/71 NB operation.

But data from the second period of ARVN operations in the same general area paint a different picture. The ARVN operation Toan Thang in February and March was paralleled by higher Enemy/FANK kill ratios, (between 3.4 and 6.5 compared to a high of 2.4 for the previous four months), greater FANK willingness to seek and engage the enemy^{1/}, and as Table 12 indicates, slightly better performance than three or four months earlier.

^{1/} FANK launched 25 ground attacks against enemy positions in March compared with a total of 16 for the previous five months; in addition, the conditions of FANK casualties shifted: between October and January 31 only about 30% of all FANK KIA were incurred outside FANK defensive positions; in February and March about 50% of all FANK KIA died outside their own wire.

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TABLE 12

ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIOS a/

	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>ARVN Present</u>	
			<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Enemy Attacks</u>	(8)b/	(22)	(3)	(5)
Enemy KIA	36	154	61	71
FANK KIA	8	90	2	30
Ratio	4.5	1.7	30.5	2.4
<u>FANK Attacks</u>	(4)	(7)	(2)	(25)
Enemy KIA	0	26	3	70
FANK KIA	2	6	1	16
Ratio	--	4.3	3.0	4.4
<u>Other Contacts</u>	(12)	(27)	(25)	(25)
Enemy KIA	28	28	76	66
FANK KIA	13	45	17	10
Ratio	2.2	0.6	4.5	6.6

a/ Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces

b/ Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.

These statistics by no means prove that FANK fights better simply because ARVN is present. (A counter example is provided by data from MR 2; see below p. 27). The most important effect ARVN has on FANK combat proficiency is probably indirect; ARVN makes the enemy change his activity vis-a-vis FANK which, in turn, affects what FANK does. But the data from February and March strongly imply that when ARVN's presence is accompanied by other factors, such as good communication between FANK and ARVN leaders, ARVN's presence tends to have a direct and beneficial effect on FANK performance.

Military Region 2

- Action and Casualties. MR 2, south and west of Phnom Penh, has vied with MR 1 as the most active military region. Although 83 more combat actions have been reported in MR 1 for the period beginning last July, MR 2 led the nation in total combat actions for five of the last nine months. Casualties have also been high; MR 2 has contributed about 24% of total FANK KIA.

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The enemy has dominated the war in MR 2 despite about an 8:1 combat strength ratio in favor of FANK over the last nine months. Table 13 indicates FANK has gradually moved outside their defensive positions (i.e.: FANK actions plus contacts) but even if all reported contacts are considered as FANK initiated, the data indicate the gap between enemy and FANK activity has not narrowed significantly. Although the ratio has improved slightly, the enemy continues to start at least two fights for every one started by FANK, even if we assume all "contacts" are FANK initiated.

TABLE 13

ACTIONS IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>
Contacts	67	200	229
Enemy Actions a/	26	28	22
FANK Actions b/	210	332	449
Total	303	560	700
Enemy as % of Total Actions	69	59	64

a/ Includes ground attacks, ABF, LOC interdiction, sabotage and terror.

b/ Includes ground attacks and ambushes.

Casualties in MR 2 have declined in 1971 despite high activity levels on both sides (Table 14). It is difficult to account for the decline; there has been no shift in activity similar to the enemy concentration on standoff attacks which occurred in MR 1. The ability of the enemy to limit his KIA total this year to a level below that sustained last summer--despite the upsurge in activity brought about by the Pich Nil operation in January--suggests either that the enemy units in MR 2 are very good or FANK forces there are very poor.

TABLE 14

CASUALTIES IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	38	80	122
In Enemy Actions	148	110	63
In FANK Actions	2	18	11
Subtotal	188	208	196
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	213	327	176
In Enemy Actions	56	185	59
In FANK Actions	75	30	48
Subtotal	344	542	283
Total KIA	532	750	479
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.8	2.6	1.4

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- Enemy Activity in MR 2. Man for man, the enemy units in MR 2 are more active against FANK than enemy units in MRs 1, 3 and 4. The mix of enemy activity in MR 2 (Table 15) has been different from that reported for MR 1, and shows a greater reliance on ground attacks. The enemy launched only about 1.5 attacks by fire for each ground assault in the last half of 1970. This ratio increased to 4:1 in 1971, but was lower than the 9 to 1 ratio in MR 1. One of the factors which must have contributed to low enemy casualties is better performance during attacks. The highest enemy casualty rate during attacks was one KIA per attack (3rd Qtr 1970) and it has been as low as .3 (1st Qtr 1971); in MR 1 the enemy usually loses 2 to 3 KIA per attack..

TABLE 15

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 2: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	60	107	87
ABF/HAF	82	160	319
LOC Interdiction	42	51	28
Sabotage/Terror	22	9	15
Other	4	5	2
	<u>210</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>451</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.4	1.5	3.7

- FANK patterns and Performance. Table 16 shows FANK strength in MR 2. FANK combat troops have outnumbered the enemy there by as high as about 9:1.

TABLE 16

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>MR 2</u>				
Combat	31.4	36.9	33.0	37.1
Support	3.1	3.6	3.6	8.3
Total	<u>34.5</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>45.4</u>

The second effort by FANK to launch and carry through a major clearing operation--Operation Pich Nil--was made in January and involved 5,000 FANK combat troops. Although ultimately successful in opening Route 4, this operation required ARVN assistance and US air support. Most observers have commented or implied that the operation demonstrated FANK problems rather than proficiency. Again, the problems identified most often in field assessments were poor leadership and lack of combat experience.

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FANK units in MR 2 have performed at levels lower than those attained by units in MR 1 since the dry season began in October 1970. Despite a friendly enemy combat strength ratio which has been as high as 9 to 1 (September 1970), FANK units in MR 2 have not been able to improve their enemy kill ratio (Table 14); this year the kill ratio in MR 2 has fallen to about the level attained in MR 4 (1.4 for MR 2, 1.7 for MR 4), which is slightly worse than the poorest record achieved by RF/PF units in South Vietnam in the last three years (1.6 in the 2nd half of 1969 in GVN MR II).

The enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength has not improved noticeably either. As Table 17 indicates, it declined after reaching a high of about 5 last fall to a point below that attained last summer. For the last six months it has been only about half as good as that achieved by FANK units in MR 1.

TABLE 17

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2			
Enemy KIA	115	181	94
FANK Strength (000)	31.4	36.9	33.0
KIA per 1000 Strength	3.7	4.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1			
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.7	8.8	4.6

MR 2 has also been the site of joint ARVN-FANK operations comparable to those discussed in MR 1. We investigated closely the ARVN assistance in opening Pich Nil Pass on Route 4 (14-31 Jan 1971), to judge whether the patterns we saw in MR 1 were also reflected here. They were not.

Table 18 shows how the introduction of ARVN to the Pich Nil operation during the last two weeks of January reduced enemy pressure against FANK. As ARVN entered the picture, the enemy standoff attacks dropped to about a third the level attained the two weeks prior to ARVN intervention. Ground attacks had actually slackened earlier, and the lower rate of about one per week was maintained as ARVN pushed along Route 4.

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TABLE 18

FANK - ENEMY INTERACTION NEAR ARVN IN MR 2
(Weekly Average)

	1970				ARVN			
	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1-15 Jan</u>	<u>Present 15-31 Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	
Enemy Activity								
Ground Attacks	1	3	4	1	1	1	1	
ABF/HAR	1	1	2	6	2	3	3	
FANK Attacks	0	0	0.3	1	2	0	0	
Other Contacts	2	1	5	3	5	1	3	
Enemy Killed by FANK	4	3	37	15	2	1	3	
FANK Killed by Enemy	1	8	10	4	7	3	3	
Kill Ratio	4.0	0.4	3.7	3.8	.3	.3	1.0	

In contrast to the December road clearing operation in MR 1, the ARVN intervention was paralleled in MR 2 by a greater FANK willingness to move out of defensive positions. (The average rate of FANK attacks and contacts increased.) But FANK combat proficiency, as measured by its ability to kill the enemy, actually declined. As Table 19 indicates, the number of enemy killed per FANK attack or contact was lower while ARVN was present than when ARVN was absent.

TABLE 19

ENEMY/FANK KILL RATIO a/

	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1-15 Jan</u>	<u>ARVN Present 15-31 Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
<u>Enemy Attacks/Amb</u>	(14)b/	(1)	(1)	(3)
Enemy KIA	130	0	0	0
FANK KIA	16	0	0	0
Ratio	8.1	-	-	-
<u>FANK Attacks/Amb</u>	(1)	(1)	(3)	(0)
Enemy KIA	2	30	0	0
FANK KIA	2	0	10	0
Ratio	1	-	-	-
<u>Other Contacts</u>	(20)	(7)	(10)	(5)
Enemy KIA	14	0	3	4
FANK KIA	19	4	2	9
Ratio	.7	-	1.5	.4

a/ Data includes incidents involving only FANK and enemy forces.

b/ Figures in parentheses refer to number of actions.

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Military Region 3

- Action and Casualties. MR 3, west of Phnom Penh, has less than half as much activity as either MR 1 or MR 2. Higher levels of FANK activity in the last three months raised MR 3 from the least active MR (excluding MR 5) to slightly ahead of MR 4, but only in December 1970 did the number of reported actions exceed 100 per month. Casualties have also been low; MR 3 has contributed about 9% of total FANK KIA.

The locale of combat activity has steadily moved away from FANK defenses. This year more than half of all reported actions have taken place outside FANK wire (i.e. FANK attacks, ambushes and contacts), a situation that occurred elsewhere only in MR 4.

TABLE 20

ACTIONS IN MR 3: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	75	152	127
Enemy Actions a/	20	74	142
FANK Actions b/	13	12	9
Total	108	238	278
Enemy Actions as % of Total	69	64	46

a/ Includes ground attacks, attacks by fire, LOC interdictions, sabotage and terror.

b/ Includes ground attacks, ambushes, and contacts.

Both friendly and enemy KIA peaked at the end of 1970. The enemy-FANK kill ratio has been low, but shows signs of improving. This year it was the best in Cambodia, but at a much lower absolute level than MR 1 (Table 21).

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TABLE 21

CASUALTIES IN MR 3: NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	6	49	39
In Enemy Actions	49	44	25
In FANK Actions	11	0	0
Subtotal	66	93	64
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	31	139	133
In Enemy Actions	40	29	4
In FANK Actions	74	8	17
Subtotal	145	176	154
Total KIA	211	269	218
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	2.2	1.9	2.4

- Enemy Activity in MR 3. As in MR 1, enemy activity peaked during the last quarter of 1970, but at a much lower level (509 enemy actions in MR 1 compared with only 152 in MR 3). The gain was due both to an increase in enemy forces and to greater aggressiveness. The level of enemy actions per 1000 combat strength increased nearly 20% from the summer to the fall.

Enemy activity in MR 3 has demonstrated a high reliance on ground attacks. Last summer the enemy initiated twice as many ground attacks as attacks by fire. He has since relied more heavily on attacks by fire, but the ratio of attacks by fire to ground assaults is only 3.5 to 1 this year (compared with 9 to 1 in MR 1 and 3.7 to 1 in MR 2).

LOC interdictions in MR 3 rose sharply in the last quarter of 1970; but have returned to rainy season levels this year. Terrorism became evident in MR 3 beginning about six months ago and has constituted about 10% of all enemy initiated action during the last six months. (Table 22)

TABLE 22

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 3

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	36	50	22
ABF/Harassment	19	54	78
LOC Interdiction	13	32	12
Sabotage/Terror	6	14	13
Other	1	2	2
Total	75	152	127
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	.5	1.1	3.5

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FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 3. Table 23 shows FANK strength in MR 3. FANK combat personnel have outnumbered their enemy counterparts by as high as 14:1, but MR 3 is considered a general training area by FANK and the best troops there are often sent elsewhere. (Table 23)

TABLE 23

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>MR 3</u>				
Combat	17.1	19.7	18.2	21.0
Support	2.0	3.0	2.5	3.3
Total	19.1	22.7	21.2	24.3

FANK has conducted few large operations in MR 3 although they have outnumbered the enemy by as high as 14 to 1. The reluctance to begin larger scale operations may be partly a result of difficult terrain (enemy base areas have been established in relatively inaccessible areas of the Cardamom Mountains) and the difficulty of launching and supplying large operations from Phnom Penh.

FANK troops in MR 3 have generally killed fewer enemy per 1000 FANK combat strength than FANK in MRs 1 and 2. During the last three months of 1970, when enemy activity levels reached their highest level, kills per 1000 strength have improved slightly, but Table 24 indicates that enemy KIA per 1000 FANK combat strength currently remain low and at about the same level as in MR 2 (Table 24).

TABLE 24

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 3	39	58	51
Enemy KIA	39	58	51
FANK Strength (000)	17.1	19.7	18.2
KIA per 1000 Strength	2.3	2.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 (KIA per 1000 strength)	2.7	8.8	4.6
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2 (KIA per 1000 strength)	3.7	4.9	2.8

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Action and Casualties. This year, MR 4, northwest of Phnom Penh, has been the least active region in Cambodia for FANK because enemy activity dropped off. A total of 565 actions have been reported in MR 4 since last July, the lowest for any region. The region has contributed about 13% of all FANK KIA since July, although both FANK and enemy KIA are declining. As in the case of MR 3, most combat activity appears to now be occurring outside of FANK defensive positions. (Table 25).

TABLE 25

ACTIONS IN MR 4: NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	29	65	92
Enemy Actions	124	158	71
FANK Actions	10	15	1
Total	163	238	164
Enemy Actions as % of Total	76%	66%	43%

Both FANK and enemy casualties have dropped steadily; the monthly KIA rate for FANK has fallen from about 57 last summer to about 19 this year, and the enemy KIA rate has slipped from 97 to 28. The enemy-FANK kill ratio dropped slightly last fall and has remained constant at about 1.3-1.7 enemy KIA for each FANK KIA, the lowest level of any MR. (Table 26)

TABLE 26

CASUALTIES IN MR 4: NO ARVN OR THAI INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
In Contacts	58	48	41
In Enemy Actions	44	32	18
In FANK Actions	68	19	0
Subtotal	170	99	59
Enemy KIA			
In Contacts	114	110	101
In Enemy Actions	32	4	0
In FANK Actions	144	17	1
Subtotal	290	131	102
Total KIA	460	230	161
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	1.7	1.3	1.7

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- Enemy Activity in MR 4. The data suggest an enemy effort to disengage in MR 4. Enemy activity surged in August, October and November (64, 55 and 54 actions respectively), but has declined in 1971 to about half the level of last fall. Enemy combat strength in MR 4 has also declined, but the activity drop seems to be more a result of conscious choice by the enemy than of strength reductions. The enemy activity per 1000 strength has, for example, declined from about 79 in the last three months of 1970 to 27 for the first quarter 1971. The argument that the enemy is trying to disengage is further supported by the few enemy KIA in enemy initiated actions this year. (See Table 26).

The mix of enemy activity has also changed markedly; since the beginning of the year only one enemy ground attack had been reported from MR 4 by April 28. (Table 27)

TABLE 27

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MR 4

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	27	19	1
ABF/Harassment	91	120	55
LOC Interdiction	3	16	14
Sabotage/Terror	1	2	6
Other	2	1	1
	<u>124</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>77</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	3.4	6.3	55.0

- FANK Patterns and Performance in MR 4. Table 28 portrays FANK strengths in MR 4. MR 4 has the second worst FANK/Enemy strength ratio in the country (exceeded only by MR 1). (Table 28).

TABLE 28

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>MR 4</u>				
Combat	13.4	12.1	15.0	17.8
Support	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5
Total	<u>15.9</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>20.3</u>

The enemy effort to disengage does not appear to have been prompted by greater aggressiveness on FANK's part. The number of enemy killed per 1000

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FANK combat strength has declined. Table 29 shows the steady decline from the highest level of any MR last summer to what has been the second lowest level (exceeded only by the PPSMR) this year.

TABLE 29

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FRIENDLY COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in MR 4			
Enemy KIA	97	44	34
FANK Strength (000)	13.4	12.1	15.0
KIA per 1000 strength	7.2	3.6	2.3
Ratios: In MR 1	2.7	8.8	4.6
In MR 2	3.7	4.9	2.8
In MR 3	2.3	2.9	2.8

It is difficult to account for the pattern of activity in MR 4, but one of the hypotheses generated by the data is that FANK and enemy units in MR 4 are moving toward or have reached an accommodation with each other. Several bits of evidence support the argument.

- First, MR 4 has a comparatively balanced strength ratio--in Cambodian terms, anyway. Although the worst force ratio exists in MR 1 (about two FANK to one enemy) the enemy units there must contend with ARVN. The strength ratio in MR 4 is better (about 7 to 1), but below the ratio of MR 2. FANK has shown its reluctance to raise its combat output even in MR 3 where it has a very favorable force ratio; it might be even more willing to avoid combat when the ratio is much less favorable.

- Second, command and control between Phnom Penh and MR 4 is probably the weakest link in the entire FANK structure. FANK units in MR 4 would be the most difficult to support from Phnom Penh, and even now probably get last choice so far as the flow of money, material and weapons is concerned. MR 4 commanders realize this fact of military life, a realization which could increase the desire for some sort of accommodation with enemy units in the region.

- Third, the composition of enemy units in the region could contribute to arrangements. Although our understanding of enemy structure and activities is by no means complete; there is some evidence indicating enemy units in MR 4 have a higher percentage of Cambodian personnel than enemy units stationed elsewhere in Cambodia. This may serve to dampen the conflict somewhat.

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- Fourth, there are compelling strategic reasons on both sides for some sort of accommodation. The NVA/VC elements in MR 4 may hope to avoid Thai involvement, something they face if they raise the level of conflict too high; and the Cambodians may be quite reluctant to take the war to the enemy when, as is often the case, enemy positions are in or adjacent to national or traditional shrines (eg: Angkor Wat).

Accommodation is only one explanation generated by the data. The will to fight may exist on the part of FANK units in MR 4; they may simply lack the resources. Efforts to improve the combat potential of FANK in MR 4 are underway and we hope to soon have data which indicate whether the resources obtained are having a beneficial effect. 1/

Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR)

Action and Casualties. Activity in the Phnom Penh Special Military Region has risen steadily; in March this area had become the second most active region in the country. It has contributed about 21% of the FANK KIA since July. An upsurge in FANK activity in the fourth quarter of 1970 moved the focus of most action outside FANK defenses, but the continued increase in enemy activity this year has prevented FANK from reducing the ratio much more, despite the best strength ratio in the country. (Table 30).

TABLE 30

ACTIONS IN THE PHNOM PENH SPECIAL MR (No ARVN Involvement)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Contacts	30	87	139
Enemy Actions	116	210	282
FANK Actions	8	21	38
Total	<u>154</u>	<u>318</u>	<u>459</u>
Enemy Actions as % of Total	75%	66%	61%

FANK casualties have remained steady and enemy KIA have declined despite the increase in activity. The monthly enemy KIA rate dropped from about 160 per month last fall to about 75 this year. As Table 31 shows, these changes have been reflected in a noticeable decline in the Enemy/FANK kill ratio.

1/ The MR 4 commander has continued to build his combat base despite difficulties in resupply. Beginning in April 1970, he has recruited and either trained or sent to training in RVN about 21 battalions.

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TABLE 31

CASUALTIES IN THE PPSMR, NO ARVN INVOLVEMENT

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK KIA			
Contacts	9	34	74
In Enemy Actions	37	70	59
In FANK Actions	13	31	14
Subtotal	<u>59</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>147</u>
Enemy KIA			
Contacts	27	169	125
In Enemy Actions	372	198	39
In FANK Actions	22	123	62
Subtotal	<u>421</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>226</u>
Total KIA	480	625	373
Enemy/FANK Kill Ratio	7.1	3.6	1.5

Enemy Activity. The increase in enemy activity suggests the Phnom Penh Special Military Region assumed more strategic importance to the enemy around the turn of the year. While the January attack on Pochentong Airfield captured the attention of FANK and led to extensive troop reshuffling, enemy actions in the PPSMR have been maintained at high levels since then; 104 actions in January, 91 in February and 122 for March, compared to a monthly average of about 70 last fall and 40 last summer (Table 32).

The increase of enemy activity has been a function of greater aggressiveness. Enemy combat strength in the PPSMR has remained fairly stable, but the units have more than doubled their activity level.

Man for man, their level of combat output was over twice that of enemy units elsewhere in Cambodia, took place in the military region where the enemy has the worst strength ratio, and in the faces of FANK's best troops. These factors, combined with the data which indicate the enemy in the PPSMR has cut his casualties drastically, suggest either that the enemy in the PPSMR is the best in Cambodia or that enemy units elsewhere are operating far below their capacity.

Most (88%) enemy activity in the PPSMR has been devoted to ground attacks and attacks by fire. The ratio of attacks by fire to ground attacks has increased gradually to the level attained in MR 2 this year.

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TABLE 32

MIX OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PPSMR

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
Attacks	34	55	62
AEF/Harassment	61	125	228
LCC Interdiction	15	17	10
Sabotage/Terror	6	11	15
Other	0	2	2
	<u>116</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>317</u>
Ratio: ABF/Ground Attacks	1.8	2.3	3.7

FANK Patterns and Performance

The PPSMR has always been the core of the defense of Cambodia so far as FANK headquarters is concerned. FANK units there are the best equipped, and as the January attack on Pochentong Airfield demonstrated, the FANK command is willing to quickly erode the defenses of other military regions when it senses the capital is threatened. As Table 33 indicates, the importance placed on the PPSMR has been reflected in FANK strength there. FANK combat strength has outnumbered the enemy by as high as 43 to 1 (Table 33).

TABLE 33

FANK STRENGTH (END OF MONTH ESTIMATES)
(000)

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>PPSMR</u>				
Combat	25.1	32.7	43.4	42.0
Support	10.4	10.2	10.2	15.0
Total	35.5	42.9	53.6	56.0

But the performance of FANK units in the PPSMR has not been up to the strategic importance of the region to FANK leaders. As Table 31 indicated, the FANK kill record has not been particularly good since last summer. Despite the increase of FANK combat strength in the region since January and the favorable force ratio, enemy KIA per 1000 FANK strength has declined sharply. As Table 34 shows, it has been the worst in the country in 1971.^{1/}

^{1/} Perhaps because many of the FANK units in the PPSMR are held as reserve and not committed to combat.

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TABLE 34

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 FANK COMBAT STRENGTH
(Monthly Average)

	<u>3rd Qtr 1970</u>	<u>4th Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>
FANK vs Enemy in PPSMR			
Enemy KIA	140	163	75
FANK Strength	25.1	32.7	43.4
KIA per 1000 Strength	5.6	5.0	1.7
FANK vs Enemy in MR 1 (KIA/Strength)	2.7	8.8	4.6
FANK vs Enemy in MR 2 (KIA/Strength)	3.7	4.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 3 (KIA/Strength)	2.3	2.9	2.8
FANK vs Enemy in MR 4 (KIA/Strength)	7.2	3.6	2.3

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APPENDIX

NOTE ON THE DATA AND DEFINITIONS

The Data

Many of the statistics used in this paper are from the Khmer Computer File, originated and maintained by OASD/SA. The file, now containing about 15,000 separate records, is based exclusively on data provided by the daily defense attache cable from Phnom Penh (DAMSREP). The DAMSREP, in turn, includes all situation reports which FANK units in the field have sent to FANK headquarters in Phnom Penh. The reports are passed to the Attache, translated, and forwarded to Washington within 24 hours of their arrival in FANK headquarters.

The statistics are therefore based on operational and not confirmed data, and should be used on the assumption that any given number may not be precisely correct. However, close analysis of the reports, direct observation of the collection and translation process in Cambodia, comparison with other reporting systems, and experience with similar data from Vietnam indicate that data derived from the DAMSREP provide the most comprehensive and complete portrait of actions in Cambodia currently available.

Definitions

The following definitions have been applied to the terms used:

- Contact - A combat action which takes place outside of FANK or friendly front lines.
- Attack - A ground assault, usually accompanied by fire, in which one antagonist attempts to occupy physically the position of another. The size of the forces involved is not specified.
- Attack by Fire/Harassment - The firing of weapons of any caliber or type by one antagonist at another which is not accompanied by an "attack." The number of rounds involved is not specified.
- LOC Interdiction - Efforts of one antagonist to halt or impede the movement of an opponent. This category includes reports of ambushes, minings, or physical destruction of bridges, etc.
- Sabotage/Terror - Efforts of the enemy directed primarily against the rural population or military materiel as opposed to military personnel.

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May 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Military Assessment in Cambodia (U)

In accordance with your instructions on April 16, 1971 to
conduct a military assessment of the situation in Cambodia, the
attached report is submitted.

F. J. West

M. J. Brady
Col, USA

T. Owens
Col, USMC

Enclosure

Original Enclosed
When Sent to West
Classified Enclosures

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SUMMARY

By direction of the President, three members of the Department of Defense completed an on-the-scene assessment of the military situation in Cambodia and its relation to the situation in Vietnam and Vietnamization. Their report is summarized below.

Assessment of the Threat

In the past year, the enemy has been deprived of his Cambodian sanctuary and forced to protect his supply lines. Consequently, he has withdrawn over half his forces from MR 3. By cross-border operations, the ARVN intends to keep the 20,000 NVA combat and 30,000 NVA supply soldiers in Cambodia on the strategic defensive in 1972.

In contrast, 11,000 NVA combat soldiers hold the strategic initiative against 180,000 FANK soldiers. With FANK tied down, the NVA is organizing a Khmer Communist Party. The development of a Khmer insurgency during 1972 may attract less attention than some NVA high-point attacks, but it is a greater danger in the long term both to the Government of Cambodia and to Vietnamization.

The Military Situation in Cambodia

The tempo of combat is light. Eighty-five percent of FANK have a defensive mission to hold the ground they occupy. Operations are short-ranged; the majority of contacts occur along the lines of communication (LOC). Only 35% of FANK is considered trained and ready for combat. Artillery, mortars, and non-U.S. tactical air support is inadequate. Adequate communications equipment is unavailable. There is virtually no military transportation system to move supplies or units.

Forecast

The period through November of 1972 will see moderate combat activity and will be used by all sides as a period of preparation and building.

The Issues

1. Time

Much more could have been accomplished during the first year of Cambodian mobilization. Full use must be made of the next year or accept the increasing probability of communist success.

2. Training

A major military training effort is required.

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3. Logistics

A responsive logistics system is needed to support FANK military operations.

4. Strategy

To date, the national strategy has not been aggressively executed.

5. The U.S. Role

In Cambodia, the constraint of a low U.S. profile has become a goal in itself and is operating virtually as a national objective, as opposed to the true objective of preserving the Government of Cambodia. In order that U.S. actions support national goals, representatives of the United States operating in or for Cambodia must be guided by directives which adapt to the changing situation.

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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIAIntroduction

There is but one war in Indochina, the aggression of North Vietnam (NVN) against South Vietnam (SVN). This report concerns Cambodia and its relation to the two southern Military Regions (MRs) of South Vietnam and, as such, is intended to be read as only one element in any evaluation of the Indochina war. It is the product of an on-the-scene assessment by three members of the Department of Defense who have had extensive experience in Vietnam. The team traveled throughout Cambodia and undertook by means of a stratified sample to collect data concerning the military situation and the performance of the Cambodian armed forces. In five Military Regions, the team was able to observe over 30 battalions in a variety of combat conditions, and conduct in-depth interviews with 24 of these. In addition, the team visited Cambodian supply depots, headquarters, naval and air facilities, as well as Udorn, MACV, CINCPAC and the SVN Joint General Staff. Discussions were also held with top Cambodian officials. The assessment was conducted in a one-month period, from 18 April to 15 May 1971.

The report is divided into four basic sections:

- I. Threat Assessment (through May 1972).
- II. The Military Situation (through May 1971).
- III. Forecast (through May 1972).
- IV. Issues (for 1971-1972).

There are also seven annexes:

- A. The Threat
- B. RVN Role
- C. FANK
- D. FANK Battalion Data
- E. Training
- F. Logistics
- G. MAP Plan

I. THREAT ASSESSMENT

There are about 65,000 North Vietnamese military personnel located in Cambodia, of whom 32,000 are concerned with operating a logistical pipeline which equips the enemy combat forces in Cambodia and in the southern two MRs of SVN. The other 33,000 NVA in Cambodia are combat soldiers now waging two campaigns: (1) 22,000 enemy are engaged in a main effort against SVN and are on the defensive due to ARVN initiative; and (2) 11,000 are oriented against Cambodian forces and have the tactical initiative. The enemy's options are limited by munitions and manpower constraints and by credible ARVN counter moves.

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This section is divided into three portions:

- A. The Main War -- NVN versus SVN.
- B. The Cambodian Subphase -- NVN versus the Government of Cambodia (GOC).
- C. Major Enemy Options in 1972.

A. The Main War -- North Vietnam versus South Vietnam

Since the overthrow of Sihanouk in March 1970, the North Vietnamese in Cambodia have devoted most of their attention and resources to the struggle against South Vietnam. However, the enemy's position in MRs 3 and 4 of SVN has steadily deteriorated over the past year due to four factors: (1) dislocation; (2) net attrition; (3) force diversion; and (4) supply deprivation.

1. Dislocation

While Cambodia was a sanctuary, the enemy did not deploy significant forces to guard his rear or his supply lines. With the U.S./RVN cross-border operations in May and June of 1970, however, the enemy was forced to pull units out of SVN MR 3 and back from the border areas in order to avoid their encirclement and destruction. Throughout the past year, the ARVN has continued to attack into Cambodia and the enemy has been obliged to steadily pull his forces out of MR 3. As a result of this dislocation, there has been a 57% drop in the number of enemy soldiers of all types physically located within MR 3 -- from 63,000 in February of 1970 to 27,000 in March of 1971.

This dislocation of enemy forces has allowed up to 60% of the ARVN forces in MR 3 to deploy into Cambodia, where their attack posture near Chup has threatened the southern sector of the enemy's main logistic route south. The enemy, deprived of his sanctuaries, has been forced to protect his supply lines. Without the strategic initiative, the enemy has been prevented from launching sustained attacks of his choosing against targets in either Cambodia or SVN MRs 3 and 4.

The ARVN has maintained the offensive pressure, keeping the enemy on the strategic defensive, despite a steady redeployment of U.S. forces. In the spring of 1971, with six U.S. battalions remaining in MR 3, the ARVN still deployed into Cambodia 30 of their 51 battalions assigned to MR 3.

2. Net Attrition

By infiltration, the enemy has replaced his casualties in main force units in Cambodia. However, the dislocation of his main forces has resulted in the exposure of his guerrillas in MR 3 and their losses have not been replaced. The resulting attrition has cut the guerrilla troops from 4,300 in February of 1970 to 2,800 in March of 1971, a net reduction of over 30%. Moreover, the surviving enemy combat soldiers in MR 3 are now fragmented, short of supplies and working in small units, constituting a low order threat which is being successfully contained and further attrited by 80,000 Regional and Popular Force troops.

3. Force Diversion

Of the 33,000 NVA combat troops currently in Cambodia, the enemy has diverted 11,000 from missions against South Vietnam to Cambodian targets. The diversion has further reduced the magnitude of the threat inside Cambodia which could threaten MR 3.

4. Supply Deprivation

The closing of the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) -- coupled with the 1970 U.S./ARVN cross-border operations, Operation Lam Son 719 of 1971, and air interdiction -- has curtailed munitions resupply for the enemy forces in Cambodia and in SVN MRs 3 and 4. While reports from the intelligence community differ concerning the exact amount of this curtailment, they agree that a lack of munitions had adversely affected enemy aggressiveness and offensive tactics, limiting his willingness to engage and endure in combat. The ensuing lower level of combat in SVN MRs 3 and 4 has increased the willingness of ARVN to redeploy regiment-size units into Cambodia and thus keep the pressure on the enemy.

5. Net Effect

Due to the four factors described above, the enemy has been forced on the strategic defensive in his struggle with ARVN.

B. The Cambodia Subphase

In the case of Cambodia, the North Vietnamese have been compelled to seek by force the vital forward logistics facilities denied to them after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk. This is the heart of the issue and explains enemy willingness to expend against Cambodian targets those resources which, while Sihanouk held power, had been allocated against SVN. To ensure a safe and effective line of communication (LOC) which can support their efforts against SVN, the enemy has launched a campaign within Cambodia with two objectives: (1) to neutralize the FANK forces and to demoralize the Cambodian government; and (2) to organize a Khmer Communist Party.

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1. The Neutralization of FANK

In contrast to the Main War against SVN, the NVA do hold the strategic initiative in their lesser battle against Cambodian forces. The enemy's activities during the past year resulted in three accomplishments:

a. The FANK forces were totally pushed out of northeast Cambodia, allowing the NVA to control their vital LOC from South Laos virtually unmolested on the ground. Efforts to place Khmer guerrilla units in the area have been unsuccessful, and the enemy has upgraded his main LOC to continue resupply during the wet season. Given air interdiction, the wet season through-put of supplies may not substantially reduce the enemy munition shortages. On the other hand, the existence of a secure LOC, which the enemy is attempting to use regardless of weather, poses a long-term threat to the security of SVN MRs 3 and 4 -- a threat which may become severe as our air operations are curtailed.

b. By diverting 11,000 NVA soldiers against Cambodian targets, the enemy has tied down in defensive positions a 180,000-man Khmer army. The FANK response to enemy pressure has allowed the NVA to successfully employ economy-of-force tactics. Prisoners have alleged that NVA squads are dispatched to harass and pin-down full FANK battalions, while the FANK tend to report small contacts as major attacks. By forcing the Khmers to worry about their towns and roads, the enemy has prevented offensive maneuvering by the FANK.

c. To neutralize the GOC, the enemy has moved to isolate the cities from the countryside, which has been largely abandoned by the FANK forces, and to deny Phnom Penh access to Cambodia's only port. In this effort, the enemy appears to be carefully expending his resources, content to keep up the pressure as long as the cost is not high while refusing decisive combat when FANK makes a resolute and competent push.

2. A Khmer Communist Party

The neutralization of FANK may be remediable by external aid and advice. However, the NVA have also been active in giving assistance and advice to Khmers, and the Government of Cambodia is engaged in an organizational race for control of the rural population.

There is no evidence that the NVA have been willing to divert its leadership, manpower, and logistic resources in the quantities which would be necessary to exploit in a short time-frame the governmental vacuum in the rural areas. Rather, the NVA appear to be following a game plan, similar in style and time-phasing to the growth of the Viet Cong, which is designed for slow and steady communist progress in organizing the countryside.

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The proselyters of the Lao Dong Party have developed several propaganda themes which they are exploiting. From intelligence sources and from POW interrogations*, the following points have emerged:

The Lao Dong Party has dispatched experienced cadres into Cambodia to work with dissident elements, such as the Khmer Rouge. NVA soldiers are acting as advisors to some Khmer Rouge units, and in other cases are integrating Khmers into NVA units. The NVA claim to support Sihanouk, whose stock still appears to be high in rural areas. Sihanouk maintained that as long as he was Premier, there would be peace. When he left, there was war. The NVA claim the war is between the Sihanouk forces and the Lon Nol forces, who are "American lackeys." When asked why they are in Cambodia, the NVA say they are there only temporarily to help the Khmers and ask the people to judge by the NVA actions who is the true enemy. This invites contrast between their own careful conduct and use of small bore weapons on the one hand, and the undisciplined depredations of the ARVN and their heavy use of air and artillery on the other.

By cloaking themselves as liberators, the NVA seek to justify their presence and organize local support in the countryside they occupy. This is largely done by organizing Khmer political fronts and presenting them as the true representatives of the people. These fronts then serve as the vehicles to organize the countryside politically and militarily in support of the North Vietnamese Army. For the sake of wider credibility, the NVA surrender, in name, much of their autonomy by subjugating their own activities to Khmer Rouge interests. However, little control is in fact given the Cambodian Reds and none that is harmful to the purpose of the NVA.

If the Lao Dong organizational work is successful and an indigenous communist force becomes sufficiently powerful, the objective of the NVA to provide a Cambodian base for their operations in South Vietnam will spawn a second war -- that of a Khmer Communist Party against the Government of Cambodia. In the long term, this "breeding potential" places the existence of the Khmer Republic in jeopardy. In the short term there is the danger that, as the FANK forces build up, so will the Khmer Communists. One military force could offset the growth of the other, resulting in a stalemate in which FANK would not have the surplus forces to join with ARVN in offensive operations against the NVA.

As things now stand, the FANK profess little concern about the countryside they have abandoned, being convinced that ethnic differences preclude the organization of Khmer by any group of Vietnamese. Thus, while the FANK plan for rural pacification is two months behind schedule and has not yet begun, the Cambodian government sees no reason for urgency. Occurrences during the next dry season will demonstrate whether the Cambodian

* Unable to interview in the countryside, our sources were the handful of available NVA prisoners in Cambodia and, therefore, we are talking about a potential danger rather than an established fact.

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officials were correct in assessing a low priority to pacification or the NVA has been successful in mobilizing a sizeable portion of the rural population.

C. Enemy Options

Given the enemy situation as described above, there are three basic courses of action for the 1972 dry season (November 1971 through May 1972) open to the NVA units operating in Cambodia opposite SVN MRs 3 and 4. They are: (1) attack South Vietnam in force; (2) attack the Government of Cambodia in force; and (3) continue protracted war.

1. Attack South Vietnam In Force

This option seems the least appealing alternative to the NVA, given current assumptions concerning munitions and manpower drawdowns in Cambodia. Due to ground and air interdiction efforts, the enemy has been obliged to consume more arms and munitions than he has received over the past 18 months. It appears unlikely that the NVA would launch major attacks against SVN MRs 3 and 4 during a period when they are uncertain of adequate resupply.

The same reasoning applies to manpower. Heavy losses, if taken without prepositioning replacements, would seriously degrade the enemy's ability to defend against an ARVN counterstrike against Kratie or Stung Treng. Loss of either of those Cambodian towns would cut NVA logistic lines to the south. Given that gain-loss equation, it appears doubtful that the NVA would attempt an attack in force against either SVN MR 3 or 4 in 1972.

2. Attack the Government of Cambodia In Force

The primary constraints upon this option are enemy goals and force diversion. Concerning goals, it is assumed that the NVA would expend sizeable quantities of munitions and men against Cambodian troops (backed by U.S. air) only if such action in a substantial way served their purpose in SVN. The NVA cannot govern Cambodia directly and, even if a puppet Khmer government were placed in power, it is questionable whether SVN would allow Chinese munitions ships to once again enter the port of Kompong Som. In addition, too much attention to objectives in Cambodia might lure the NVA into a force diversion which would expose their vital LOC east of the Mekong to ground interdiction. The NVA must keep two to three divisions protecting Chup as long as ARVN forces threaten the enemy's LOC. In this sense, RVN's self-interest protects the self-interest of the Government of Cambodia. The NVA do not dare to ignore ARVN by moving in force against the GOC.

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3. Continue Protracted War Under Adversity

This option differs from the two above in that it would represent for the NVA more a recognition of reality than of desire. It would simply be an admission, in terms of resource allocation by the NVA, of a physical fact of life: that the RVN possess the strategic initiative in the actual border areas of Cambodia and that a big push against Cambodian objectives would not compensate for the risk and costs. This option would call for high-point attacks in SVN MRS 1 and 2 to gain political leverage in the U.S. and to demoralize the people of SVN. This strategy would keep pressure on SVN.

In Cambodia, the NVA would continue to build both supply stocks and the Khmer Communist Party. By adopting a Laos-type scenario of short, sharp attacks and long lull periods, the NVA would seek to demoralize rather than destroy the FANK. If the FANK forces showed signs of crumbling, they could expect the NVA forces to come on with renewed vigor, not by diverting more forces to the battle but by increasing the tempo of operations of their forces already committed. (The NVA forces committed against Cambodian targets are fighting at a rate of intensity four times less than the tempo of operations in, for instance, Quang Nam province in SVN.)

This Protracted War option would be a recognition by the NVA that in 1972 the situation in Cambodia would not change substantially. Thus, 1972 would be a building year for all. This option appears the most probable event.

II. THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. The Character of FANK

1. Tempo of Operations

Throughout the Cambodian countryside, there is a general lack of the physical evidence of war. This impression comes from the relatively small amount of damage caused by explosive ordnance, the few bridges destroyed, and the intact condition of most of the buildings. Moreover, during the past year, less than 3% of the Cambodian infantry strength were killed in action -- compared to an average of 9% for ARVN, who are better trained, led, and equipped than FANK. Battle statistics also indicate a significant increase in attacks by fire and small-unit harassing tactics. The nature of these contacts is not severe and the damage is comparatively light.

FANK is disposed in an overwhelmingly defensive posture. The primary mission of 85% of the 24 battalion-size units visited was to defend the ground they occupied. The commanders of these units limit their actions to squad and platoon-size patrols ranging on an average three kilometers from their unit location. Eighty percent of all reported contacts occurred along the lines of communication. The conclusion to be drawn is not that there is no conflict, but rather that the nature of the battle is light and the initiative belongs to the enemy.

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2. Ammunition Distribution

A hoarding phenomenon affects FANK's offensive operations. Unit commanders interviewed indicated a reluctance to initiate combat operations that were likely to require a significant expenditure of ammunition. This same attitude generally restricted expenditures of ammunition for training purposes. Due to unresponsive resupply procedures, commanders refuse to expend ammunition without strong provocation, believing such action would increase their vulnerability in the event of enemy contact before the ammunition has been replaced. Therefore, it was common for a commander to indicate a desire for more ammunition. However, none of the commanders interviewed were at that time, nor had they ever been, out of ammunition.

The FANK G-4 and Director of Materiel both acknowledged the principle of pushing ammunition down to the units. However, they also recognized their inability to do this, saying that the best they could presently hope for was to ensure an adequate ammunition supply at military region headquarters. It was then the business of the unit to complete the resupply. However, transportation is a missing link; 23 out of 24 battalions visited had no vehicles. The most wealthy battalion in this regard that we encountered owned two trucks. In no case did we find transport that was considered adequate to responsively meet the needs of a maneuver battalion.

3. Initiative

Enthusiasm for war in the abstract is not enthusiasm for warfighting in the mud and heat. Most FANK units on the battlefield are no match for NVA units of like or smaller size. The Cambodian soldiers do not seek contact. Although the reasons for this are complex, the recognition of NVA prowess is believed to be a significant deterrence. The tendency not to seek offensive military operations is encouraged by the strong central command-and-control procedures of FANK. Operational orders originate in only one of two places -- either FANK headquarters (referred to in awe as "The High Command") or, at the Military Region headquarters. Orders issued by subordinate commanders are done so in strict compliance with the instructions received from FANK headquarters or the Military Region.

4. Firepower

Another notable characteristic that directly impacts on the FANK military capability is the widespread lack of organic firepower, as well as the failure to integrate and apply the available firepower. At the time of our visit, there were only 54 105-howitzers in all of Cambodia. Of the battalions visited, 70% had eight or less mortars; the average battalion had five mortars of all calibers. Half of all mortars inspected had no sights or other aiming equipment. An estimated one-third of all mortars were Chinese 82-millimeter mortars in which U.S. 81-millimeter ammunition is fired.

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Of the 24 battalions sampled, 50% never used artillery and had never been supported by tactical air. In the case of those units who had used artillery or close air support, the fires were adjusted by the battalion commander. Typically, the battalion commander feels that he is the only member of his command skilled enough to adjust fires.

5. Communications

The FANK units are constrained by the lack of communication equipment. The average battalion possesses seven radios with which it must communicate with higher headquarters, subordinate companies, and available fire support. As a result, normal coordination is minimal, and reports are generally fragmentary and late.

Of 9,000 radios in the FY 71 MAP, only 3,000 have been delivered to date.

6. Military Skills

It was clear at all levels that there is a great need for people who know what they are doing. By generous standards, only 35% of the FANK officers can be considered trained, with another 35% being former NCOs. Thirty percent of the officers have been assimilated directly into their positions without prior experience or training. The situation is most critical in the combat specialists skills of weapons crewmen, communications, medics, and small-unit logistics. Our sample indicated that one-third of the battalions have received no training, with the remainder ranging from partially trained to about 35% that are considered well-trained.

The total effect is that of a slow-moving army encumbered by a lack of supplies and poor leadership, and with little appreciation for the integration of military operations.

B. FANK In Perspective

1. A State of Seige

Cambodia is in a state of seige. Only the Mekong and a few National Routes remain open, and their future as supply routes is far from a certainty. Cambodia is being isolated and divided -- isolated by interdiction and divided by the loyalties of the people of the cities and the agrarian culture of the countryside. The pattern is not new. The urban population is subject to a government information system and has been exposed to political concepts, whereas the farmer is insulated by a lack of communication.

2. Esprit

The strongly nationalistic Khmers see themselves in the midst of an interminable mobilization to maintain a free Cambodia. Their efforts in this regard are directed by the three-phased Lon Nol strategy that calls

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first for Holding and Building -- holding the centers of national wealth while building toward a position of offensive strength. The next phase is the Base Expansion, a process of increasing the area, population, and resources controlled by the Government of Cambodia from which the final Offensive Phase of the strategy to reclaim total control of the country is to be launched.

Although relatively untested in a direct contest, the FANK leaders believe that they are locked in an intense struggle with the Army of North Vietnam. The Khmers allege a deep dedication and faith in ultimate victory. They are eager to recount their battles and tell of their success. This enthusiasm is undimmed by the actual magnitude of the reported events. Khmer nationalism is held to discount the possibility of a division of loyalties between the urban and rural population. This identity relegates all ideologies to a lesser status and is regarded as unaffected by foreign influence.

Concern must also be voiced over whether or not the FANK will be able to overcome their deficiencies in time to save Cambodia. It is clear that FANK depends, as they must, on U.S. military assistance to pull them from their present status up to a more viable position. All inquiries referring to FANK shortcomings were met with an optimistic response. Even the Americans in Cambodia are eager to contrast FANK's meager beginnings with their continuing initiative to build an army. However, the Cambodians have been mobilizing for more than a year and, while they have much to show for their efforts, much more could have been accomplished. A brief examination finds their efforts incomplete when compared to the vital nature of the task they face. The issue is, therefore, how much time is needed to gear for war. Yet, there is no phased schedule of objectives to identify requirements or measure the progress made. An institutionalized response attesting to FANK's youth and enthusiasm is offered to explain their poor performance. The explanation is not persuasive.

C. Military Assistance Program

The assessment confirmed that without assistance the Government of Cambodia cannot meet its military requirements. The United States portion of that assistance is critical to the Cambodians. In view of the undetermined, but nonetheless finite, time factor within which the Government of Cambodia must build its forces to a level capable of defeating the enemy, military assistance must be responsive to Cambodian needs. Therefore, periodic analyses of the military situation are required.

Four factors have surfaced during our assessment which impact on the U.S. Military Assistance Program:

1. Hidden Costs

Of immediate concern are the costs of MAP which have been borne by other services or organizations rather than by MAP funds. For example, normally 10% of the MAP program is dedicated to the packing,

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crating, handling, storing, and transporting of MAP goods. However, because the Cambodian MAP is using Service warehousing and storage facilities in SVN, which the recipient country normally provides, these costs are expected to increase significantly. To date, some of these costs have not been borne by MAP. Moreover, the important Mekong River supply route has largely been sponsored and financed by the U.S. Navy, which has accepted the major portion of the repair and support costs for the river fleet.

2. Ammunition

In the 1972 MAP program, ammunition costs amount to 60% of the program. Ammunition planning for Cambodia has been based on ARVN offensive expenditure rates. Thus far, both the tempo of the action and the actual rates of expenditure in Cambodia have been considerably below those experienced in the Republic of Vietnam. As a result, some savings may be possible by programming ammunition stockage for Cambodia at a more realistic level, thereby releasing additional program funds for other military items. (The Services are pressing for sufficient funds to introduce a Cambodian ammunition pipeline in lieu of continuing the support through Vietnam.)

3. Cross-Funding

There is a current shortfall of approximately \$76 million in the FY 72 Cambodian MAP plan. In view of this deficit, a review of all assistance programs for Cambodia -- specifically, aid funds -- would determine whether non-MAP funds can be used to buy military-related items.

4. Expenditures

About \$75 million of the FY 71 \$185 million authorized had been delivered by May of 1971, despite the high and obvious demand. The stated rationale is that deliveries are not to exceed FANK's absorptive capacity. Yet our assessment revealed the urgent need for additional equipment at the battalion level, such as individual equipment and mortars, which FANK could absorb right now with minimum training.

5. MAP Coordination

From a rather austere beginning, the U.S. MAP for Cambodia has become the second largest U.S. assistance program. However, the assessment team's observations at the unit level pointed up equipment deficiencies which officials at higher levels, both U.S. and Cambodian, assumed to have been remedied by the U.S. MAP program. In fact, this program is designed to support an 85,000-man force in FY 71 and is being diluted when spread among 180,000 men. Moreover, MAP deliveries to Cambodia are running slow and delivery from Phnom Penh to the unit level is a major deficiency in FANK.

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U.S. personnel limitations and to a much lesser degree FANK reluctance has limited on-site inspections and unit visits. It appears that the two principal U.S. agencies responsible for execution of the MAP are operating with conflicting objectives. On the one hand, the Embassy views the guidance of a low U.S. profile in Cambodia as the operative constraint. In contrast, the MEDT views the objective of building FANK to a 220,000-man forces as the overriding consideration.

The urgency of the situation and the extremely limited program in the early stages dictated a departure from the normal MAP procedures. Since these instructions have been issued, significant changes have occurred both in terms of the size of the MAP and the organization to administer the program. The lines of authority for efficient administration of the MAP are not clear and are presently interpreted in conflicting terms by the various field agencies.

D. ARVN In Perspective

As was indicated in the Enemy Situation, the emergence of a friendly government in Cambodia has contributed significantly to the improved internal security of southern SVN. This is especially true of SVN MR 3, where pacification is proceeding apace. The VSSG Control Indicator has risen from 47% in February of 1970 to 71% in March of 1971.

In MR 4 also, the main force has continued to improve during the current dry season as ARVN has applied pressure against four enemy base areas. One of these -- the Seven Mountains area -- has reached the point where the Joint General Staff (JGS) is planning to redeploy a regimental combat team for operations across the border. The enemy threat, however, is low in the Cambodian area closest to MR 4, so the ARVN regimental task force operating out of MR 4 will also help hold open the Mekong, currently the economic life-line to Phnom Penh.

Additionally, it may be necessary for RVN to continue to conduct the bimonthly naval escort convoy to Phnom Penh. The JGS is dissatisfied about the costs of this naval support and their reluctant compliance may prove an additional spur to the GOC attempts to hold open a land route to the sea.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the JGS is well aware of their limitations and of reduced U.S. support. While they believe cross-border operations in the northern sectors of SVN -- opposite MRs 1 and 2 -- would be strategically more effective in 1972, they are more apt to limit themselves to sorties from MRs 3 and 4, where terrain, LOCs and rear areas are safer. To cope with the flareups expected next year in the northern two MRs, the JGS is relying upon reinforcements from the two General Reserve Divisions, perhaps buttressed by a Provisional Ranger Division. Movements by the General Reserve, however, should not affect the planned cross-border operations of the ARVN forces regularly assigned to MRs 3 and 4. The area of greatest concern is the Chup rubber plantation, to the west of MR 3 and Saigon. The JGS plans to use between one and three ARVN divisions to offset the two to three enemy divisions in that area.

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ARVN has the troops to do so, because the enemy divisions around Chup were formerly within MR 3. RVN plans, as stated by the JGS Deputy Chief of Staff, and the current employment of ARVN units both reflect a Vietnamese perception that it is in their own best interests to operate in force inside Cambodia. They intend to continue to do so throughout the next year, even though they anticipate a diminution in U.S. air and logistic support. At the least, these operations should tie down between two and three enemy divisions, enhancing security inside South Vietnam and limiting the pressure which the enemy can apply against Cambodia.

In sum, the most probable course of events in Cambodia during the 1972 dry season will see the enemy placing first priority upon the protection of his north-south logistic LOC, which runs from South Laos to the Chup area. Provided the ARVN retain the initiative and maneuver so as to pose a threat against that LOC, the enemy in Cambodia should remain on the strategic defensive and, because of logistics constraints, should not be able to mount a strong attack threat against SVN MRs 3 and 4.

Hence, Cambodia does not appear to be a critical problem for RVN in 1972. In fact, RVN should benefit from the situation in terms of increased internal security.

However, the NVA are fighting a two-track war: the political revolution within SVN and the main force threat to SVN. Even as the political revolution wanes, NVN still retains the capability for main force combat. The enemy position at Chup presents a long-term main force threat to southern SVN. We will probably see a stalemate there in 1972, based on an RVN reluctance to absorb casualties and an NVN necessity to restock supplies. In 1973, a reduction in U.S. air interdiction is likely with a refurbished main force enemy in Cambodia on the one hand, opposing increased internal security in SVN on the other. In the long term, a stalemate around Chup which sees three NVA and three ARVN divisions glaring at each other is a benefit for NVN. The leaders of SVN may have to be prodded to look beyond 1972 in order to see this.

E. Cambodia and Vietnamization

The situation which exists between the Government of Cambodia and the NVA is not expected to change sharply enough during 1972 to have a major impact on Vietnamization. The ARVN will continue to operate in Cambodia, but a major drain on RVN resources to shore up the GOC appears unlikely. Equally improbable is the emergence of a strong, aggressive FANK capable of putting pressure upon the NVA base in Cambodia.

It is in 1973 and beyond that Cambodia will emerge as a plus or minus to Vietnamization. If the GOC becomes seriously entangled fighting a Khmer Communist Party, RVN resources may be diverted to shore up the GOC, with a resultant net deficit accruing to Vietnamization. On the other hand, if FANK grows stronger and more aggressive, the GOC, in concert with RVN, will be pressing in on the NVA enclave in northeast Cambodia and the progress of Vietnamization will be improved.

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For this reason, the events of 1972 need to be watched as a harbinger of things to come.

III. FORECAST

A. RVN

Next year will probably see a stalemate between NVA and ARVN in Cambodia (1) because the NVA must replenish their manpower and supplies and (2) because the ARVN appear war-weary and politically constrained to an acceptable number of casualties. This situation should allow internal security in SVN MRs 3 and 4 to improve, provided the ARVN in Cambodia apply enough pressure to keep the NVA tied down in the Chup area. An increase in internal security may free more ARVN units for operations in 1973 in Cambodia. By then, FANK may be able to contribute offensively. On the other hand, the enemy may increase his strength in the next year. We simply do not know. In the Main War in Cambodia, 1972 will be a year of building for both sides.

B. GOC

In the Subphase War of the NVA versus the FANK, we do not expect a sharp deterioration in the position of the GOC. But we are concerned about two potential dangers:

1. Accommodation

If the sacrifices for prosecuting the war become costly (and they are not now), the GOC may seek an accommodation with their former "business partners." Since RVN will most likely not permit a reopening of Kompong Som to enemy shipping, an accommodation could be struck with the NVA desisting in their efforts to organize a Khmer Communist Party in return for use of eastern Cambodia.

This development would not be a severe blow to Vietnamization, since the FANK has not as yet manifested an offensive capability. It would free the 11,000 NVA currently targeted against Cambodia, which would be a significant but not overwhelming gain for the NVA.

2. A Civil War

The development of a Khmer Communist Party could proceed through two phases. In the first phase, FANK would be tied down fighting Khmers. This development would not be a severe blow to Vietnamization, but the attendant publicity could adversely affect the level of our aid to the GOC. In the second phase, the Government of Cambodia might fall, with new leadership sympathetic to the Lao Dong Party then seizing power. Psychologically and physically, this would be a severe blow to Vietnamization. An RVN attempt to blockade Kompong Som against the strenuous objections of the Cambodian Government might prove politically disastrous.

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IV. THE ISSUES

A. The Time Remaining

Cambodia has used about one year in its mobilization program. The findings of the assessment team indicate that their efforts have fallen short of the requirements. There is still some time left, estimated at approximately one year, within which the Government of Cambodia must meet its mobilization goals or, failing that, accept a decreasing probability of success with each passing day.

B. Needs of the Government of Cambodia

The findings of the assessment indicate three areas of concern:

1. Training

The Government of Cambodia requires a training capability, in or out of country, which will provide a qualified army to preserve the Republic.

2. Logistics

The Khmer army needs an adequate logistics base that will provide the materiel needed to fight the war.

3. Active Prosecution of Strategy

The national strategy must be aggressively executed. To date, this has not been the case.

C. Needs of the United States

In Cambodia, the constraint of a low U.S. profile has become a goal in itself and is operating virtually as a national objective, as opposed to the true objective of preserving the Government of Cambodia. In order that U.S. actions support national goals, representatives of the United States operating in or for Cambodia must be guided by directives which adapt to the changing situation.

An accurate overview of military progress, measured against time-phased objectives, is lacking. This is in contrast to our Vietnamization experience which has provided a unity of effort in achieving national goals through an explicit program which integrates the responsibilities of U.S. agencies, their field representatives and, where possible, participating third countries.

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ANNEX A - The Threat

- I. From CINCPAC J2: "NVA Manpower/Munitions/Food Input Options into Cambodia: June 1971 - December 1972."
- II. The MACV J2 Enemy Order of Battle comparative recapitulation for Cambodia and for SVN MR 3 from February 1970 through March 1971.
- III. A Summary of some salient themes which emerged from POW interrogations in Cambodia.

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I. NVA Manpower/Munitions/Food Input Options into Cambodia:
June 1971 - December 1972

Q. What is the current number of VC/NVA battalions in the "dual threat" area inside Cambodia; i.e., capable of attacks on either the GKR or GVN?

A. Strength of VC/NVA combat and administrative forces broken down by areas opposite RVN MR's 2, 3, and 4 (as of 1 April 1971):

1. MR 2		
Combat (3 Bns)	1500	
Admin svcs	<u>7500</u>	
Total	9000	
2. MR 3		
Combat (51 Bns)	16000	
Admin svcs	<u>24000</u>	
Total	40,000	
3. MR 4		
Combat (9 Bns)	2400	
Admin svcs	<u>1100</u>	
Total	3500	

Q. How does present disposition of VC/NVA forces in dual threat area compare with the situation in July 1970?

A. Strength of VC/NVA combat and administrative service forces broken down by areas opposite RVN Mr's 2, 3, and 4 (as of July 1970)

1. MR 2		
Combat (11 Bns)	4800	
Admin svcs	8300	
2. MR 3		
Combat (43 Bns)	12,700	
Admin svcs	19,800	
3. MR 4		
Combat (9 Bns)	2600	
Admin svcs	1100	

Q. If there is a marked difference, why?

A. A marked difference in the areas opposite RVN MR's 2 and 3. For MR 2 the difference is due to redeployments into RVN and Laos of several combat units to include elements of the 24th, 28th, 66th and 95B NVA Regiments. For MR 3 the difference is due to additional deployments from the RVN into Cambodia as well as the arrival of 1971 infiltration replacements.

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Q. What is the current number VC/NVA battalions in Cambodia targetted only against Cambodia?

A. Strength of VC/NVA combat* forces targeted only against Cambodia by FANK MR. (as of 1 April 1971):

1. MR 1
900 (3 Bns)
2. MR 2
7900 (17 Bns)
3. MR 3
800 (3 Bns)
4. MR 4
1100 (3 Bns)
5. MR 5
900 (2 Bns)

*No administrative service forces have yet been identified in this category.

Q. How does present disposition of VC/NVA forces targeted against Cambodia compare with the situation in July 1970?

A. The strength of VC/NVA forces presently targeted against Cambodia is estimated at 11,600. In July 1970, the enemy was almost exclusively deployed in defensive reaction to allied cross-border operations, with only limited forces in FANK MR 2 and 5 targeted against Cambodian installations. No precise breakout of forces thus committed is available, but the best estimate of VC/NVA strength in Cambodia is approximately 49,000 by end July 1970, and of this number as many as 4,000 combat troops were oriented against Cambodian targets.

Q. How are VC/NVA forces in the "dual threat" area inside Cambodia supplied: (a) with food, (b) with munitions? How does the process differ for those units targeted only against Cambodia?

A. (Reference VC/NVA logistics Factbook (Second Update) 1 April 1970.)

1. The enemy has a fairly complex and efficient supply system in support of his forces throughout Southeast Asia. Insofar as possible the enemy will procure needed supplies from the local market. Monies required for needed purchases are obtained primarily through a taxation system. The populace in VC/NVA controlled or contested areas pay tax in money or goods in kind. Goods are converted to money instruments which in turn is distributed throughout the system for use in local procurement.

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2. As the taxation base supporting the VC/NVA diminishes, increased amounts of money instruments must be imported from NVN or countries supporting NVN. However, the principle of local procurement insofar as possible holds. Available information indicates that the bulk of enemy supplies are obtained as follows:

a. Foodstuffs. Southern MR II, III, and IV of RVN and Cambodia: predominately local procurement. Food deficient areas of southern MR II and III of RVN and northeast Cambodia are supplied from the food surplus districts of this area. Northern RVN, local procurement with as much as 30% possibly imported from NVN.

b. Clothing. Initial issue is carried by the individual when he infiltrates from NVN. Replacements predominately obtained through local procurement.

c. Military equipment. Equipments that have a commercial use (entrenching tools as example) are obtained locally. Equipments of purely military value are predominately imported with a significant amount obtained by battlefield capture.

d. Ammunition. The bulk of ammunition requirements must be imported. However some, possibly significant amounts continue to be obtained by battlefield capture and local manufacture.

3. One supply system serves enemy forces located in Cambodia and in southern RVN. Consequently it is effectively impossible to breakout the supply status by units located in various portions of this area or by the threat posed by units in this area. Since July 1970 CINCPAC has viewed the supply status of units in RVN MR III and IV and in Cambodia as a package. The only variable is difficulties imposed by distribution distances, i.e. even though supplies are available in the system, their delivery to a unit operating on the Ca Mau peninsula is far more difficult than delivery to a unit operating in northern Cambodia.

4. Viewing this area as a package, it is generally food surplus and contains a relatively dense population (taxation base). Consequently it is concluded that enemy food, clothing and the bulk of military equipment requirements can be obtained locally.

A large quantity of weapons were captured during cross-border operations, but many were old family retrograded weapons. With reduced enemy strength in the area, weapons resupply is not expected to be critical to the enemy's selection of options at least through mid CY 1972. Consequently the enemy's current critical import requirement is ammunition.

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Q. Prognosticate. Regarding enemy logistics, what are the worst, best and most probable cases during the separate dry and wet seasons which will occur before January of 1973?

A.

1. Worst. On the high range of 769 tons the enemy logistically could mount a seven day attack on Saigon if the enemy were willing to face total supply exhaustion before resupply could be accomplished.

2. Bdst. On the low range of 64 tons, he would probably husband this as a reserve for unforeseen contingencies.

3. Probable. It is believed the enemy will continue his economy of force operations, attacking extremely lucrative targets of opportunity while attempting to restock his supply system to the March 1970 levels.

(The above estimate applies, regardless of season, until January 1972. Projection beyond this date is limited by unknown friendly capabilities).

4. Analysis of prognosis through beginning 1971-72 dry season throughput.

a. Most of current enemy expenditures, particularly in southern RVN is due to FWF initiated actions. Consequently it is doubtful that the enemy can significantly reduce his current level of consumption.

b. Faced with the 1 Dec 1971 balance sheet the enemy can be expected to conduct limited offensive actions only under the following circumstances.

(1) Overruns of FWF outposts when the probability of capturing more ammunition than is expended is great.

(2) When his remaining stocks are threatened. In this instance he can be expected to tenuously defend his reserves.

(3) When the target or objective of the attack is extremely lucrative while offering minimum risk.

(a) The opportunity of decimating a FWF unit while suffering no risk of counter action.

(b) An opportunity to reap an extreme psychological/political gain at minimum risk and cost (i.e. ABF/Sapper/Terrorist attacks against Phnom Penh).

5. Prognosis through the 1972-73 dry season throughput is more difficult. It is not believed that the enemy will withdraw more units from the

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RVN nor divert more supplies therefrom. However, as reduced U.S. air assets cause air interdiction to become less effective, supply throughput can be expected to increase out of proportion to the degraded effectiveness. Reduced ground interdiction or threat of ground interdictions would also release significant ground forces from LOC security in Laos for employment in Cambodia or RVN. While such a prognosis could be made its validity will be entirely dependent on estimates of the effectiveness of residual U.S. air resources and the degree of improvement of RVNAF and FANK to include paramilitary forces.

Q. What are the independent variables and critical assumptions which drive this prognostication?

A. An estimate of supply posture, considering ammunition as his critical requirement, is subject to significant variables because of numerous factors that can not be accurately quantified.

a. How much ammunition remained after May-June 1971 cross-border operations? We now have an accurate estimate of the amount of ammunition input through Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) from 1966 through 1969. We know how much ammunition was captured during cross-border operations. However, estimates of how much the enemy shot or lost to capture and destruction during 1967 through 1969 can not be accurately assessed. Our best estimate is that he had 1000-1700 tons of ammunition remaining after cross-border operations.

b. The enemy overran the national depots at Lovek and Kompong Speu, the district depot at Stung Treng and smaller but significant depots at Siem Pang, Virachey and other areas. Contacts in which FANK withdraws probably result in battlefield captures. Although FANK reports state that all ammunition was either evacuated or destroyed, the probability exists that some (but an unknown amount) of ammunition was captured.

c. Estimates of daily consumption (expended, captured and destroyed) is considered acceptably accurate for MRs III and IV of RVN. Knowledge of enemy consumption in Cambodia is totally dependent on FANK reporting. Many incidents are not reported by FANK and those that are, are believed to be inflated. As a consequence best estimates to date of consumption in Cambodia are developed by extrapolation of consumption in MR III and IV of RVN.

d. Considering these variances, the enemy is estimated to have the following ammunition tonnage available in his Cambodia/southern RVN supply system:

(1) Remaining after cross-border operation	1000-1700
(2) Input from Laos through 21 Apr	1158
(3) Probable input by steel-hulled trawlers	200

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- (4) Total 2358
- (5) Minus daily consumption 1 Jul 70 - 21 Apr (@ 6 STPD) (1770)
- (6) Total available 21 Apr 71 588-1288
- (7) Possible Laos throughput through mid-May 600
- (8) Possible additional throughput until height of wet season 400
- (9) Total availability until input resumption for 1971-72 dry season (1 Dec 71) 1588-2288
- (10) Minus additional draw-down @ 6 STPD until 1 Dec 71 (1524)
- (11) Available for high points or stockpiling 64-764

Q. At what level of munitions (and in what geographic configuration) can the enemy legitimately be considered to pose a credible threat against Saigon? Against Phnom Penh?

A. Two division equivalents with attached anti-aircraft units attacking Saigon for a period of seven days plus an additional 12 battalions at a lower level of holding actions would require an ammunition availability of about 550-600 tons. The enemy would compensate for heavy supply loss due to pre-stock captures and air destruction. Therefore it is doubtful that the enemy would consider an attack of this magnitude with less than 750-800 tons of ammunition pre-stocked. If the enemy should have this amount of ammunition available in his COSVN supply system it is doubtful that it would be cached much forward of the Kratie area. It is possible that the enemy could move supplies to the Cambodia/RVN border by truck, but further movement would have to be by man-pack, animal cart or waterborne logistics craft.

For an attack on Phnom Penh the level of stockage would be the same. Since the VC/NVA control few of the roads between Kratie and Phnom Penh, movement would be almost exclusively by man-pack, animal cart, or boat.

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Q. What level of input with what lead times would he need to establish in order to move towards a credible offensive attack posture?

A. To minimize the possibilities of detection, it is doubtful that the enemy would employ more than 20 trucks per night to the border (80 tons) and transship the following night. As numerous routes would be used from the border a further move of about 160 KM would be required. Given the worst possible situation that the enemy could move all supplies by cart or boat (carts about two tons, small boats about one ton) about 50 vehicles would be required for each nightly shuttle of about 20 KM. Therefore 20 trucks would be active in Cambodia for about 10 days, and starting with day two, fifty vehicles shuttling would increase to a peak of 400 vehicles active. The entire move would require 18 days.

The logistics lead time for an attack on Phnom Penh would be shortened to approximately nine days. Input level would remain the same.

Q. Would we detect such a build-up, if so, and when? What is the range of possible error?

A. Although the enemy would spare no effort to move supplies discretely with the number of vehicles involved and a large number of transshipment points, the possibility of detection would be good. The most probable period of detection would be at the height of movement or 8-10 days lead time. In order to carry out these attack, however, the enemy would also have to reposition the participating main force units.

The movement to within 20-30 KM of the target area could be delayed until a week prior to the attack. Based on current disposition of enemy forces, movement lead times of at least two weeks for Phnom Penh and 30 days for Saigon should provide ample opportunity for detection.

Q. It is alleged that Lam Son 719 may have resulted in over 6,000 tons of enemy supplies captured, consumed or destroyed. How does that break out between munitions and food?

A. The final MACV report on Lamson 719 reflected 20,000 tons of ammunition and 1,282 tons of food captured or destroyed.

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Q. It is alleged that Lamson 719 resulted in only about 25% as much throughput reaching SVN/Cambodia as of 23 March as was true last year. What is the significance of such an allegation? That is, how does it relate to enemy capabilities in Cambodia? Does it affect the rate and intensity at which they can prosecute the war in Cambodia? If so, how and why?

A. There has been no known allegation that Lamson 719 resulted in only about 25% throughput reaching RVN/Cambodia compared to last year. However, Lamson 719 along with increased effectiveness of air interdiction, increased irregular operations (as exemplified by Operations SILVER BUCKLE and DESERT RAT) and increased consumption required by additional NVN units in Laos have combined to restrict the enemy's throughput into Cambodia and RVN to about 33% of the throughput into RVN last year. Thus far this year (20 April) it is estimated that the enemy has throughput 6260 tons from Laos compared to 18,525 tons last year.

To understand the significance of this reduction in SEA, the loss of an average of 15 tons per day of ammunition that was available through Kompong Som prior to March 1970 must be considered. This year's total estimated availability of 6260 tons compares to 23,925 tons last year. As relates to Cambodia, we estimate that the entire availability of supplies through Kompong Som (a consumption availability of about 5,400 tons per year) was destined for forces in RVN MR III and IV. This year, he must sustain his forces in southern RVN as well as Cambodia with a maximum estimate of about 2,350 tons (1350 estimated to have been throughput plus 600 tons that could enter Cambodia prior to the onset of the wet monsoon and as much as 400 that could be throughput before heavy rains stop all traffic). After considering draw downs for a low level of operations (see discussion of questions 1 through 8) the enemy would have available only about 60 to 760 tons for stockpiling or offensive actions. We expect the enemy to hold a portion of this reserve to protect the stocks from being overrun by FWF operations.

Although the enemy would retain the logistics capability to mount selective high points or offensive, the objective would have to be sufficiently lucrative for the enemy to accept a "go-no-go" proposition. That is, the enemy would understand that if he failed to accomplish his objective, his ability to continue even the current low level of activity might be negated.

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Q. It is alleged that in March of 1970 the enemy was massing to strike into GVN MRs. What was the strength, disposition and munition level of those forces then? What was it in March of 1971?

A.

1. In mid-March 1970 there were 17 VC/NVA regiments comprising elements of four divisions, operating along the RVN/Cambodia border with an estimated combat strength of 24,000 men. Disposition of these forces is shown on the attached map. Prior to the allied cross-border operations, based on an analysis of input minus consumption, it is estimated that the enemy had about 5,000 tons of ammunition in base areas. A lower figure of about 2,800 tons is based on an estimated 18 month resupply cycle with no consideration given consumption or BDA.

2. In mid-March 1971 these forces had been augmented by both replacements and a new regiment from NVN and by creation of two new regiments. However, many of the units had moved well into the interior of Cambodia. Along the border, the enemy forces still stood at 17 regiments and an estimated combat strength of 24,000 men. Disposition of these forces as well as those in the interior is shown on the attached map. The estimated stockage in border base areas cannot be currently estimated, however, overall stockage available as far south as the Kratie area is estimated to have been approximately 300-1000 tons as of mid-March 1971.

Q. What is our best estimate of the average number and size of enemy battalions and guerrillas operating in Quang Nam Province from Nov 1968 through May of 1969? What is our best estimate of the number of tons of munitions supplied to them during that period?


A.

1. The following are average enemy strength figures for Quang Nam Province during the November 1968 - May 1969 time-frame:

- a. Number of battalions - 19
- b. Battalion strength - 240
- c. Guerrilla forces - 3600

2. The tonnage of munitions supplied to Quang Nam Province is not available. However an estimated 2001 short tons was supplied to enemy forces in MR-I during the period. Based on the proportion of enemy strength in Quang Nam Province a pro-rata figure of 25-30 percent (500-600 tons) of the MR-I tonnage was probably supplied to the province.

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Q. If FANK has a ratio of 5:1 combat to support troops, why is the NVA in Cambodia persisting with a 1:1 ratio (32,000 in each category)? How much do we know about classifying troops this way? What difference in output and effectiveness measures does it make?

A. The 32,000 VC/NVA Administrative Service personnel presently in Cambodia do not limit their support to the 32,000 VC/NVA combat troops also located there. These support personnel include the higher echelon command and control as well as the bulk of the political, logistical, communication, propaganda, medical, and transportation personnel for all of southern RVN and Cambodia. The overall ratio of combat to administrative service personnel is actually about 2:1 within the total area being supported by COSVN (approximately 106,000 to 54,000). The ratio of supported to supporting troops within this same overall area is even greater since the administrative service personnel within the RVN are dependent to some degree on their counterparts in Cambodia. If this aspect is considered, the ratio goes to better than 3:1 (approximately 105,000 to 32,000). The classification of VC/NVA forces into combat and administrative service categories has been studied exhaustively by the intelligence community for the past five years with particular screening of the problems since August of 1968. Within the community-accepted criteria the breakout of enemy forces in Cambodia is considered accurate to the same degree as the estimate of forces, or approximately plus or minus ten percent. Quantitization of differences in output and effectiveness measures is not available, but as a general rule it would appear that the FANK organization is excessively light in support personnel, if the 5:1 ration is valid, and this factor should adversely impact on their combat capability vis-a-vis the VC/NVA.

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II. COMPARATIVE RECAPITULATION - MILITARY REGION 3 and CAMBODIAFEB 1970

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS*</u>	<u>ADMIN SERVICES</u>	<u>GUERRILLAS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
NVA	14,105	-0-		14,105
VC	18,305	26,225	4,258	48,788

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS **</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE BATTALION STRENGTH</u>
NVA	10,815	53	204
VC	11,255	62	181

JUN 1970

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>ADMIN SERVICES</u>	<u>GUERRILLAS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
NVA	9,865	1,600		11,465
VC	9,580	17,525	3,534	30,639

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE BATTALION STRENGTH</u>
NVA	6,420	36	178
VC	4,730	27	175

<u>CAMBODIA ***</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>ADMIN SERVICES</u>	<u>GUERRILLAS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
NVA	3,540	2,700		6,240
VC	6,600	15,500	0	22,100

<u>CAMBODIA</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE BATTALION STRENGTH</u>
NVA	3,770	20	189
VC	4,520	24	188

MAR 1971

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>ADMIN SERVICES</u>	<u>GUERRILLAS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
NVA	3,770	1,600		5,370
VC	8,290	10,715	2,771	21,776

<u>MR 3</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE BATTALION STRENGTH</u>
NVA	2,980	18	165
VC	3,580	28	127

<u>CAMBODIA</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>ADMIN SERVICES</u>	<u>GUERRILLAS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRENGTH</u>
NVA	9,945	2,905		12,850
VC	6,030	19,515	0	25,545

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<u>CAMBODIA</u>	<u>M & CS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF BATTALIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE BATTALION STRENGTH</u>
NVA	7,605	34	223
VC	3,910	17	230

* Maneuver and Combat service elements.

** The Revised Intelligence Terminology used for this category reflects Battalion Echelon strengths only; Hqs and Support elements at Division and Regimental levels are not included.

*** The term CAMBODIA for this summary denotes those Cambodian provinces considered to be contiguous to Military Region 3; i.e., Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, Kratie and Svay Rieng.

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III. A Summary of POW Interrogations* and Other Discussions in Cambodia -
26 April - 6 May 1971. (Submitted by Charles Bevoit, Jr., a RAND
Corporation consultant.)

It is necessary to declare at the outset that the observations which follow could not have been possible had I not made previous trips to Cambodia in February and May of 1969 and May of 1970. During these trips I had numerous, uninhibited conversations with Cambodians, overseas Chinese and local Vietnamese residents. Almost without exception the Vietnamese language was used as a common language. Not limited to Phnom Penh, I travelled in all into several areas along Vietnamese border, along the seacoast (Kep Kompot) and Kompong Som, through Kompom Thom to Siem Reap and finally through Sisophon to and over the Thai border on the way to Bangkok.

My exposure this trip varies greatly with that of the past. First there are no longer large numbers of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia. They have either in fear of their lives repatriated to SVN or of the small numbers that desire to remain, prefer not to disclose their true nationality. Others remain in government concentration camps or prisons. Due to the Lon Nol's government's political stance, the Vietnamese language as a means of communication no longer enjoys the favor it did two years ago. In fact, one year ago it was universally avoided by nearly everyone.

It is interesting to note that the content of conversations has also changed. In the past political conversations were extremely easy to initiate. One talked freely about the internal Cambodian situation along with Sihanouk's foreign policy in connection with SVN war. About the only topic which was not discussed was the VC/NVA presence on Cambodian soil. The current situation represents the reverse, the VC/NVA presence being the central point.

A further point to be mentioned is the close parallel between the general impressions I came away with after previous trips and my conclusions after talking in the last few days with some nine POW's and Hoi Chanh (VC/NVA).

*Editorial Note:

There were 27 known NVA prisoner/ralliers whose dossiers were provided the interrogator. Of the 27, the interrogator chose 12 subjects for interview, of whom only 3 were provided. So the interrogator talked to a sample of 11% of the prisoners. In addition, he talked to 9 other prisoners provided in lieu of the 9 he had requested, for a total sample of 33%. But 3 of those prisoners the interrogator considered shell-shocked, dropping the sample to about 22%.

However, given that there are 65,000 NVA soldiers in Cambodia the sample interrogated as a percentage of the whole is only .0007. Thus, we are talking of impressions, and not of a valid sample of the total population.

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This is to say in fact that although the situation in Cambodia has greatly changed my general conclusions that follow are about the same.

It should not be necessary to point out the relatively superficial nature of these observations. They are personal opinions without scientific, statistical basis. They do, however, derive from face-to-face contact and are backed by several experiences in Vietnam.

In the past, Neutralism had been stressed by everyone as the key to Cambodian peace. It kept Cambodia peaceful and was personified by Prince Sihanouk. For example, in conversations with ethnic Vietnamese they would invariably substitute the Cambodian word in an otherwise completely Vietnamese sentence. This led me to believe it was a common topic among the people. I came away with the strong impression that this concept was quite popularly perceived. Everywhere I went the war in VN was mentioned. There was a realization of powerful forces at play capable of drawing Cambodia into the fray. Only Neutralism and Sihanouk kept them out. This then was repeated so often by so many people that it became almost trite. In short, a great fear of the war combined with a simple desire to make a living, which, of course, war would prevent. Only the Prince and his maneuvers made this possible. Because of Sihanouk there was Neutralism. With Neutralism there was peace. Only with peace as I was told so often could one make a living to support a family--the most basic consideration of peasants who exist in a subsistence economy.

No principles were involved. The criterion was simply whatever was good for Cambodia. I believed that Sihanouk as the personification of this belief was very popularly perceived in rural Cambodia. Even this trip I never heard Sihanouk the man spoken ill of. Even a military officer instrumental in his overthrow at each mention always respectfully called him in Vietnamese Mr. Sihanouk, not just Sihanouk.

I am convinced in fact that to the common Cambodian peasant maintenance of peace represented his greatest personal accomplishment. Several prisoners mentioned that the people frequently asked them when Sihanouk would return to straighten out this mess (the war).

In my conversations with VC/NVA they portrayed this presence of war, loss of peace, as the foremost consideration among the people. To the degree that maintenance of peace is perceived by the common Cambodian as the result of Sihanouk's personal political juggling, his overthrow by Lon Nol meant therefore by definition war. I do not think communism is an issue in the countryside. It surely is, however, in Phnom Penh villas.

One prisoner discussed aggression. The word is often distorted. We are apt to say, for example, that a Vietnamese born in a certain hamlet by becoming a VC commits aggression on that hamlet. Saigon's radio broadcast to that certain hamlet, at least to the local residents as a result lack credibility.

One prisoner explained that in contacts with Cambodian peasants the question of aggression is faced directly. Saigon troops, NVA, Americans

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who are the aggressors? It is pointed out, that the NVA are seeking Sihanouk's return and a restoration of peace. They are working through local Cambodians (Sihanouk's front, Cambodian Liberation Front). For example, their papers for travel in small groups must be signed by local Cambodian officials to avoid arrest and detention. It is unnecessary to belabor their scrupulous behavior toward the villagers. One Hoi Chanh pointed out the penalty for a stolen chicken could if turned in by the people be death. It is likewise unnecessary to point out in contrast the looting and pillaging blatantly conducted by the Saigon ARVN. One of the FANK battalion commanders in an ARVN AO made the statement that the people had requested him to see that ARVN troops left the area. On the other hand this battalion commander was militarily totally dependent upon them for supplies, communication and fire support. The Americans, of course, support Lon Nol. Who then are the real aggressors? Another prisoner felt that in the Cambodian peasants' mind there really is no question of aggression. Only Lon Nol's troops against Sihanouk's supporters.

On the side of Lon Nol's government, the situation is straightforward -- North Vietnamese Communist aggression.

This is what the government-run Vietnamese and Chinese language dailies stress as the enemy. But in the popular eye there are Vietnamese on this side too. It appears to be assumed that given the historical hatred between Cambodians and Vietnamese, which borders on racial prejudice (the Vietnamese, for example, are capable of styling dark-skinned Cambodians as uncivilized Montagnards) under government leadership it would only be a matter of time before the Khmer people rallied together against the Vietnamese aggressors. However, given the above I do not see how either aggressions, Communism or Vietnamese presence can be effectively used to this end.

It must be remembered that the VC/NVA use of Cambodian border areas as sanctuaries was not popularly perceived, it affected the daily lives of few Cambodians. Nor was Sihanouk's aid to these sanctuaries primarily motivated by pro-communist motives. His object as popularly perceived by Cambodian peasants was the maintenance of peace. This did affect the daily lives of Cambodians.

I am assuming in the following that regardless of who fired the first shot, the vast majority of the rural destruction I observed in Cambodia was caused at least by our response, if not initiation, specifically air and artillery. This fact must be borne in mind. For whether or not rural Cambodians accept it fatalistically as the inevitable consequence of war depends greatly on whom they blame for the war. Even one of the Hoi Chanhs felt that too many of the rural Cambodians with whom he came into contact, this destruction proved to the people that Lon Nol's government did not care. At least several said the people made no distinction, simply that the destruction was caused by Lon Nol's plans.

One POW said how in their contacts with Cambodian peasants they talked mostly about Sihanouk. He felt 90% of rural Cambodians were Sihanouk supporters. He added they avoided mention of Khmer Rouge for the peasants disliked them. He stated further that to them the new government was simply

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anti-Sihanouk. This would make one wonder just how valid Lon Nol's government's claims are that it is just a matter of time before the Khmer people rally together against the North Vietnamese communist aggressors.

Regarding perceptions of popular feeling toward Sihanouk, I often reflected upon the degree of similarity between what I felt after traveling through Cambodia two years ago and what I was being told in general by the VC/NVA prisoners and Hoi Chanh.

Given the fact that assessment of guilt for war-caused rural destruction depends largely on whom one regards as the instigator or aggressor. The danger must be faced of a widening war with resultant increased rural devastation driving the Khmer people, in whose name the war is conducted, into the arms of the very enemy the war is directed against.

Thus, the question of whom the Khmer people blame for the war is an important one. Do they really all blame the VC/NVA? Or do they not blame more simply those who overthrew Sihanouk and prevent his return. There are at a minimum two sides to the question. A Khmer Krom FANK First Lt. informed me that as long as the Khmer people can still fight Sihanouk will never be allowed to return. I'm not convinced it is that unanimous. To what degree does there exist an urban-rural or civilian-military split?

One Hoi Chanh took great effort to explain VC/NVA efforts at organizing Cambodian villages. He explained it was a people's war and, therefore, the organization followed lines practiced in SVN. I had no basis for determining the degree that his remarks were statements of intention or actual execution. He did say the recruitment of Cambodian youth was relatively easy. He pointed out that most of the Khmer Rouge units with whom he had contact were new recruits between the ages of 17 and 30. He spoke of regimental size units comprised of over 30% Cambodian. He mentioned other totally Khmer units with the NVA acting only as advisors. He said the people were told that given the VC/NVA's experience they would provide the technical and military support in the initial stages of the Khmer struggle until such times as they (Khmer Liberation Front) were strong enough to carry on their struggle alone.

In conclusion, despite numerous reports of enemy propaganda and recruiting among the Cambodians, the "enemy" remained unclassified or as simply VC/NVA. Just how much the "KC" have developed is moot. However, the prospect of their future development is a threat which must be faced. At the very least, it appears to me quite naive to assess that Khmer support to the VC/NVA is necessarily coerced or, in those cases where it has been voluntary, due to their being misled and deceived by enemy propaganda. The final conclusion that it is just a question of time before they can be won back to the Khmer cause does not appear justified by hard evidence. Time may in fact be working in the opposite direction. In the absence of proof, I resort to the use of the subjunctive case. But it is clear the Lao Dong Party is organizing in the countryside and yet that threat is being ignored in the city of Phnom Penh.

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ANNEX B

THE ARVN ROLE IN CAMBODIA

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Annex B - The ARVN Role in Cambodia

Interview with Lieutenant General Nguyen Manh, Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff (Saigon - 4 May 1971).

1. Q. General, when do you intend to pull your troops out of Cambodia? Just before the rainy season begins in June of 1971?
 - A. No, we do not intend to pull our troops completely out of Cambodia even during the rainy season. We have pulled back to positions which we consider along Route 7 adequate for defensive purposes even if they are partially under water. We plan to hold these positions throughout the rainy season in strength. Beginning in the next dry season we will again reinforce in Cambodia and continue to keep the pressure upon the 5th, 7th, and 9th enemy divisions in the Chup area.
2. Q. Given that the U.S. will be reducing in strength next year also, how do you intend to operate in Cambodia?
 - A. We plan on operations in strength up to and including two divisions. However, we may not be able to go as deep as we went in 1971. It is doubtful if we could attack as far north as Kratie, unless we had the assistance from FANK, and that seems doubtful. In addition, we plan to move across the border from MR 4 in strengths up to and perhaps over regimental size. This will be possible because the 9th Division which has been working in the Seven Mountains area has fundamentally cleared that base area and therefore will be returning to become a mobile sweep force along the border.
3. Q. What do you plan to do in regard to other cross-border operations opposite the other MRs?
 - A. In MR 2, we are thinking of some small operations. You would call them raids. We do not plan any large-scale multidivision operations.

(General Manh did not mention Military Region 1 in connections with cross-border operations. Several attempts to initiate a discussion concerning a repeat of an operation such as LAMSON 719 evoked no response.)

4. Q. Do you anticipate that enemy pressure upon Cambodia could force you to divert ARVN forces from enemy targets to the defense of Cambodian targets?
 - A. We are aware of this possibility. We do have plans to defend Phnom Penh.

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Annex B

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5. Q. How do you envision the enemy utilizing his resources in Cambodia and in South Vietnam Military Regions 3 and 4 in 1972?
- A. I expect that the enemy will attempt to harass us but basically there will be no change from his present performance; that is, he will use some high points mixed with long lull periods.
6. Q. But what if the enemy decides to launch large-scale attacks? Not necessarily in the southern sectors of South Vietnam but in the northern sectors?
- A. (The General avoided a definite answer to this question. Instead he insisted that ARVN would seize the initiative by cross-border operations and that this initiative would prevent the enemy from being able to launch attacks of his choosing.)
7. Q. Are you expecting problems in the north? We have noticed that in the last few days, for instance, the District of Dailoc in Quang Nam Province has come under heavy pressure.
- A. I expect that we will have to reinforce in the north as the U.S. Marine Division and as the Americal Division pull out. We intend to use the General Reserve of which there are two divisions now around Saigon; that is, the Airborne Division and our Vietnamese Marine Division. President Thieu is thinking of a third General Reserve division to be comprised of 9 Ranger battalions. As you know, there are now 5 Ranger battalions in MR 1, 5 in MR 2, 6 in MR 3, and 9 in MR 4. By putting together some of the battalions now in MRs 3 and 4 we could come up, if we had to, with another reserve division. We would intend to keep the families of the rangers of our other reserve divisions where they are now. We have no plans of permanently moving the families of the reserve divisions to MR 1.
8. Q. You do not anticipate then that there will be a drawdown of Vietnamese resources in order to support the government of Cambodia?

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- A. I wouldn't go as far as that. However, we certainly hope that the FANK, who are fighting a rather small enemy in the Pich Nil Pass area, would be able to open Route 4 from Phnom Penh to Kompong Som. Having to keep open the Mekong to Phnom Penh requires bi-monthly convoys which take thirty to forty escort ships. We do not intend to continue indefinitely to absorb the cost for this operation. We want the FANK to do more for their own country.
9. Q. In the southern half of South Vietnam, how do you see the year 1972 shaping up?

- A. The critical factor is the enemy's logistic system from South Laos to Kratie. As long as we keep the pressure against Chup, the enemy will continue to keep at least two of his divisions in that area to block us. If he moves out of that area, he exposes his logistics line. I don't expect him to move out of that area.

On the other hand, we probably will not be moving in force into the Chup area. You know, the Chup when there are leaves on the rubber trees, is worse than operating in the jungle. It is a thick, almost impenetrable forest. And we have been operating without much U.S. air. We haven't been able to get the B-52 strikes that we need to operate properly. Supposedly, this is because the Cambodians wish to keep their rubber assets intact. I do not know about that, but I do know that for us to operate effectively in that area, we need heavy air support. Our artillery simply does not have much of an effect in there. Now we know that with fewer U.S. resources available next year, the probability of getting the sort of support we want is less. Therefore, I do not anticipate that we will be operating in force inside Chup. But as long as we hold a blocking force just outside of Chup, we feel that the enemy will be tied down in that area.

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ANNEX C

FANK FORCES

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ANNEX C - Tank Forces

PLANNED US MAP FORCE STRUCTURE*

ARMY	Major Units	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
	Infantry Brigade (General Reserve)	3	18
	Infantry Brigade Hq	10	18
	Pioneer Eng Co	1	18
	Artillery Btry (105mm)	0	18
	Reconnaissance Plat	1	18
	Light Trans Plat	1	18
	Infantry Battalions	38	72
	Mechanized Brigade		
	Mech Brigade Hq	0	1
	Mech Inf Regt (Bn) Hq	0	1
	Arm Cav Troop	1	1
	Mech Rifle Co	0	2
	Motorized Inf Regt (Bn) Hq	0	1
	Motorized Rifle Co	0	3
	Lt Trans Plat	0	1
	Armored Regt (Bn) Hq	1	1
	Tank Co (M-24)	0	2
	Arm Car Co (AMX)	0	1

* Force structure is being coordinated with FANK. Ambassador and Chief MEDT-C have approved and FANK Headquarters is expected to approve with minor modification.

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
Artillery Brigade		
Hq & Hq Btry Bde Arty	0	1
Hq & Hq Btry Arty Regt (75mm)	0	1
Hq & Svc Btry Arty Bn (75mm)	0	3
Arty Btry (75mm)	0	9
Hq & Hq Btry Arty Regt (105mm)	0	1
Hq & Svc Btry Arty Bn (105mm)	0	3
Arty Btry (105mm)	0	9
Engineer Brigade		
Hq & Hq Co Engr Bde	0	1
Lt Engr Equip Co	0	1
*Hq & Hq Co Engr Const Bn	0	0
Engr Const Co	0	0
*Hq & Hq Co Spt Bn	0	0
*Engr Spt Co	0	0
Hq & Hq Co Combat Eng Bn	0	1

* Not MAP supported, however units' are in-being and it is likely that some hidden US funds could/will be diverted to support these units.

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>
Combat Engr Co	0	3
Hq & Hq Co Pioneer Eng Bn	1	2
Signal Brigade	1	1
Transportation Bde		
Hq & Hq Co Trans Bde	1	1
Hq & Hq Co Trans Bn	1	1
Trans Lt Trk Co	3	3
Hq & Hq Co Trans Bn	1	1
Trans Lt Trk Co	3	3
Trans Det (Med)	1	1
Military Police Bde	0	1
Special Forces Gp		
Detach "A"	6	12
Detach "B"	1	2
Logistics Command	1	1
Hq Co Log Command	1	1
Ordnance Co (DS)	1	1
Ord Maint Depot	1	1
EOD Team	1	6
Aerial Spt	1	2
Signal Co (DS)	1	1
Station Hosp	1	1
Engr Depot (Fld)	1	1

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
QM Depot	1	1
Ord Storage Depot	1	1
Ammo Depot	1	2
Ambulance Co	1	2
Field Hosp	1	1
Signal Depot	0	1
Coll, Class & Salv Co	0	1
Petroleum Depot	0	1
Medical Depot	0	1
Military Region Hq	0	6
Sub Military Reg Hq	0	23
Military Region Log Base	0	5
Sub Mil Reg Log Base	0	15
Regional Inf Bns	32	
Inf Bn Hq	72	74
Weapons Plat	52	74
Rifle Co's	128	296
Inf Co (SEP)	234	561
Arty Btry (75mm) (SEP)	0	2
Arty Btry (105mm) SEP)	14	14

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>
NAVY		
Coastal Surveillance Sqdn	0	1
Patrol Craft (PC)	2	2
Patrol Craft Fast (PCF)	0	12
Motorized Armed Junks	0	14
Landing Ship Inf (LSIL)	1	1
Landing Craft Tank (LCT)	1	1
Mine Countermeasures Sqdn	0	1
Mine Sweeper (MSL)	0	4
River Assault Interdiction Division (RAID)	1	2
Command and Patrol Boat (CCB)	0	2
Monitor (MON)	1	6
Armored Troop Carrier (ATC)	0	14
Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB)	4	10
LCM Refueler (REF)	0	4
LCM-6 (Flame)	0	2
River Patrol Group (RPG)	1	2
River Patrol Boat (PBR)	20	40
River Patrol Craft Small	8	8
Logistics Operating and Support Sqdn	0	1
Landing Craft (LCM-6)	18	24
Landing Craft (LCM-8)	0	5
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	1	3
Mobile Base	0	2
Tug (YTL)	0	4
Tug (TYB)	0	1
Landing Craft Inf (LCI)	1	1
Support Bases & Activities	0	2

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>
Marine Battalions	0	5
AIR FORCE		
Air Force Hq	1	1
Air Region Hq	0	1
Tactical Air Base Wing	1	1
*T-28 Fighter Sqdn	1/19	2/32
AC-47 Attack Sqdn	1/6	1/8
O-1 FAC Observation Sqdn	1/17	1/25
C-47 Transport Sqdn	1/13	1/13
U-1A Lt Trans Sqdn	1/12	1/18
UH-1 Light Helo Sqdn	1/6	1/16
Training Air Base Wing	0	1
T-41 Training Sqdn	1/10	1/18
T-28 Training Sqdn	0	1/8
Lt Helo Tng Sqdn	0	1/4
Air Base Sec Bns	1	6
Base Communication Sqdn	1	1

* As of time report submitted only 18 T-28 have been approved.
Substitute A/C is being considered.

PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE (Contd)

Major Units

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>
*PARAMILITARY FORCES		
** National Police	0	?
Directorates	0	6
Commando Groups	0	1400
<u>Military Man Power</u>		
(In Thousands)		
Army	170	181
Navy	5	7
Air Force	4	7
Defense Agencies	15	25
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sub Total	194	220
Paramilitary	<u>100</u>	<u>140</u>
Total	294	360

* Not MAP supported

** Should be USAID supported

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Annex... D

BATTALION DATA

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PERSONNEL DATA

BATTALION STRENGTH

30%	400 - 530 TROOPS
40%	300 - 400 TROOPS
30%	100 - 300 TROOPS

AVERAGE STRENGTH = 350

OFFICER TRAINING

30%	NOT TRAINED
35%	FORMER NCO'S
35%	TRAINED

TROOP TRAINING

25%	NO TRAINING
40%	TRAINED IN UNIT
35%	TRAINED





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FIREPOWER



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ANNEX E

TRAINING

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TRAINING

1. General

a. It has been recognized by those charged with the responsibility for developing the Cambodian Armed Forces that the development of a strong training base is essential. Development of this training base has relied primarily on the use of South Vietnam facilities with U.S. or ARVN instructor personnel and to lesser extent Thailand and in-country facilities. Constrained initially because of political considerations (Khmer/Vietnamese animosities), limited funding, limited instructor personnel and available facilities, the training program got off to a slow start. Only recently has the training been expanded to include the needed specialist training.

b. The sample upon which this assessment was based gave clear evidence that the training pace must be quickened, particularly in the more technical or specialist areas. To illustrate, only 35 percent of the total FANK force structure can be considered trained -- this leaves a requirement of some 65 percent requiring training or 117,000 personnel out of an estimated force of 180,000. Based on the 220,000 U.S.-approved force structure for FY 72 -- 143,000 would require training.

c. The U.S.-sponsored programs will train about 39,000 in FY 71 of which largely make up the 35 percent considered trained. Some 45,000 FANK personnel will be trained in out-of-country facilities during FY 72. This, in theory, provides a total of 84,000 trained people out of a requirement for 157,000 by end FY 72 -- normal attrition or combat casualties not considered. Therefore, under current plans, we start with a deficit of 73,000 in the critical building year of 1972.

2. In-Country Facilities

To some extent, this deficit can be reduced by improving in-country in-being facilities and opening new training centers. The quality of training and totals trained are subject to some speculation because of limited qualified instructors, inadequate facilities, and austere training aids. More importantly, the Cambodians lack the expertise necessary to develop a quality training program (See Tab 1 for the costing estimates to upgrade the facilities now being used in Cambodia).

3. Training Needs

In general terms, the FANK requires training in all basic infantry skills to include a unit follow-on program once training has been completed at one of the training centers. The need to train small-unit leaders, weapons crewmen, communicators, medics, and unit logisticians is most apparent.

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4. Training Shortcomings

Another aspect of training is the reluctance of the FANK High Command to authorize significant numbers of personnel to depart the local areas for training centers. This problem is, of course, compounded by out of country training. What is not clear is whether this reluctance is the result of a dislike of the Vietnamese, or whether it is caused by a concern for reducing the security in an area. In the past several months, efforts have been made to convince the FANK headquarters that the training of brigade and battalion commanders and small-unit leaders is a matter of greatest importance. FANK has agreed to provide personnel input in late June to start the commander training and, in the case of small-unit leaders, has agreed to provide 1,000 of the 3,000 NCOs recommended. Some officers and NCOs have received special leadership training with their units in SVN. These totals are not significant when compared to the overall requirement. In training now are 728 squad leaders, 278 platoon leaders (OJT), 59 company commanders, and 125 battalion staff officers. To show the order of magnitude of the problem, it is estimated that about 1,100 battalion officers have received some training or are now in training while the end FY 71 MAP-supported battalion strength requires a total of 2,736 battalion officers to be trained.

5. General Reserve Brigade Training

a. Contained in the FY 72 force structure are 18 General Reserve Brigades. These brigades are to remain under FANK headquarters control but will be assigned to various military districts as the situation dictates. The plans visualize this force providing the offensive capability to FANK; however, the status of training within the units to be assigned makes early achievement of this capability doubtful.

b. The following illustrates the training problems to be solved in forming this general reserve force:

- Artillery batteries - A total of 14 105mm batteries are reported to be trained. Four more are required.

- Pioneer Company - Three trained companies are available; 15 require training.

- Transportation Platoons - There are no trained platoons; 18 will be activated and trained when equipment becomes available.

- Reconnaissance Platoon - Only one reconnaissance platoon is available.

- Brigade Headquarters - Sufficient headquarters are reported available but their effectiveness varies.

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6. Cambodian Air Force Training (AVNK)

a. The AVNK had the strength of 3,002 personnel at the end of April 1971. Plans now call for the AVNK to increase to about 4,000 by end FY 71. Of this total, 741 are officers and 2,261 enlisted. The majority of the personnel are not trained in areas other than general military training.

b. With respect to pilot training, the AVNK has 90 qualified pilots and 70 maintenance officers. In training now, are 25 pilot candidates with ten due to graduate in mid-May. The addition of the T-41 aircraft to the training program will support an in-training population of 30 pilots. It is anticipated that the planned program will produce 175 graduates by 30 June 1972. It should be noted that the present program provides for only 60 hours of flight training at Battambang, which is then followed by a period of OJT at Pochentong airfield.

c. In addition to the in-country training efforts, there are 12 AVNK pilots undergoing training in Thailand. Helicopter and O-1D transition training has been conducted in South Vietnam for 23 qualified pilots.

d. The above training has satisfied the recent shortage of pilots in the AVNK; however, the requirement for additional in-depth training is required to enable the AVNK to sustain their own operations without external assistance. Considerable improvement has been noted by U.S. personnel in Cambodia in the overall pilot training programs. Extensive expansion of the current program, particularly in the associated maintenance skills will be required if FANK is to achieve an independent capability during 1972.

7. Cambodian Navy Training (MNK)

a. The MNK appears to have a solid training base in being with detailed plans for progressive improvement. This is understandable in view of the MNK's long history of stabilization and only minimum growth since March 1970. They have been able to concentrate on improving quality without a large influx of personnel.

b. Recruit and Basic Training. Recruits are initially enlisted for a term of six years; minimum age for enlistment is sixteen. Depending on previous civilian education levels, after 1-3 months basic training, the recruits are given specialists training up to a five-month period. This specialists training concentrates in engine mechanics, radio, electricians, and gunners. OJT normally handles the requirements in the other areas such as quartermasters, armorers, tactics, drivers, and boat handling.

c. Officer Training. All of the senior officers attended the French Naval Academy. After 18 March, the MNK established an OCS,

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and have so far graduated 127 officers. There are now 103 officer candidates enrolled in the six-month course. Some officer candidates who have finished the university with an engineering degree, receive direct technical instruction as well as OCS courses. (There are now seven.) All officer candidates have 12 years or more of education. All officer candidates receive training in Marine tactics as well as nautical subjects.

d. Training Facilities. The enlisted training center is located about 200 yards south of the Chui Chang War Naval Base. Most of the training is conducted in one very large building which is divided into classrooms. The classrooms are adequate for the size of the classes. The training facility though is about at peak capacity. Many men live with their families nearby, however, those enlisted men remaining on base without families must sleep on floors and cots in the training building. There are no enlisted quarters.

A new officers school has just been constructed and will house and train the OCS students.

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Annex E

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PHASE I CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR 2500 STUDENTS

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Required</u>	<u>Budget Requirements</u>
I	Billets	Construct frames for and erect general purpose tents.	\$17,300
	Water Supply	Repair water truck in engineer depot to haul water from Phnom Penh. Drill deep well to replace truck haul ASAP.	2,200
	Sanitation	Construct 25 burnout latrines.	1,000
	Physical Security	Construct beams around tent shelters; excavate moat and place punji sticks in moat.	NONE
	Training Facilities	Transfer control of firing range to Kambol Training Center; establish a separate M-79 range; construct confidence course.	NONE
	Other	Conduct topographic survey.	NONE
	Long Range Planning	Formulate a Base Development Plan.	NONE
		Subtotal, Phase I	\$20,500
II	Billets	Replace tents with corrugated roofing.	\$33,500
	Water Supply	Construct storage system and distribution system.	5,000
	Sanitation	Continue to use burnout latrines.	NONE
	Physical Security	Construct guard towers and perimeter lighting.	16,000
	Training Facilities	Construct classrooms, bleachers, additional ranges.	20,000
	Other	Construct permanent ammo bunkers, access and service roads, kitchen/mess, supply/admin building, POL storage.	140,000
		Subtotal, Phase II	\$214,500

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III

Construct BOQs, complete water distribution system, showers, dependent housing, water-borne sewage system, recreational facilities, additional classrooms, fire station, post exchange, electrical power and distribution system, guard house, training facilities. 800,000

Total \$1,035,000

KAMPONG SPEU
CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR 2000 STUDENTS

<u>Phase Area</u>	<u>Required</u>	<u>Budget Requirements</u>
I Billets	Procure 35 GP medium tents and 5 GP small tents (MAPX), construct tent frames for same.	\$ 3,350
Water Supply	Replace hand pump on existing shallow well with gasoline pump from engineer depot. Design permanent water system.	NONE
Sanitation	Construction 20 burnout latrines.	800
Physical Security	Clear fields of vision, construct beam around tents; construct perimeter moat and berm and fill with punji sticks.	NONE
Training Facilities	Use engineer equipment to push up berm for firing ranges.	NONE
Other	Conduct topographic survey.	NONE
Long Range Planning	Formulate a Base Development Plan.	NONE
	Subtotal, Phase I	\$ 4,150
II Billets	Replace tents with corrugated roofing.	7,500
Water Supply	Construct water line or well, pump, storage tank, treatment system, and simple distribution system.	5,000

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Sanitation	Continue to use burnout latrines.	NONE
Physical Security	Construct timber guard towers and perimeter lighting.	25,000
Training Facilities	Construct additional ranges, shelter, classrooms, and training aids.	20,000
Other	Construct kitchen/mess hall.	25,000
	Subtotal, Phase II	\$ 82,500

III

Construct shower - washroom - latrine buildings, water-borne sewage system, BOQs, dependent housing, sewage treatment plant, recreational facilities, additional classrooms, fire station, post office, electrical power and distribution system.	650,000
Total	\$736,650

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Tab 1

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ANNEX F

CAMBODIA LOGISTIC SYSTEM

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CAMBODIA LOGISTIC SYSTEM1. General:

a. The Problem:

(1) The Cambodian Military logistic system in its present form is incapable of providing either emergency or sustained support to the combat forces. Given the present level of combat the system will provide minimum essentials to the Military Regions (MRs). It does provide a cornerstone upon which a self-supporting system can be built. As a predominantly agriculture nation, there is little in the way of an industrial base or pool of skilled manpower to support a sophisticated force beyond that currently planned, i.e., lightly armed infantry, backed with light artillery and limited armor. External assistance is required in the areas of requisitioning, receiving, distributing and maintaining of the materiel received from outside resources. Those indigenous skills in maintenance, transportation, supply and management should be mobilized until the MAP assisted training programs can fill the gaps.

b. Military versus Civil Requirements.

(1) The Fank depends on the civilian sector for the furnishing of food, POL, water, electricity, pharmaceuticals, telephone and radio facilities, spare parts for locally procured vehicles, tires and tire recapping. The armed forces also employ approximately 950 civilian workers. For FY 71 120 million riels have been budgeted for payment of leased vehicles. In addition, port facility charges for materials handling equipment and stevedore services are also budgeted and paid for. Uniform and individual equipment requirements consume on half of the output of the civil clothing manufacturing industry. Of extreme importance is the fact that the Bureau of Public Works does all building and road construction work for the armed forces on a reimbursable basis, since the available engineer forces are rudimentary. Funding for all areas described above are included in the national defense budget and funds are broken out to the separate services. In FANK, funds are further broken out into the various services such as Ordnance, Signal, QM, etc. Coordination of FANK requirements on the civil sector is held at the ministeriel level and accomplished through a coordinating committee consisting of permanent members who handle day to day business. Since such a significant portion of the logistical structure supporting the Cambodian Armed Forces is, and will remain, in the civil sector, it is essential that the non-military aid available to these industries be fully exploited. Thus, the provision of equipment, training, managerial assistance etc. to such organizations as the Bureau of Public Works and the port authorities from AID or other civil sources will have the dual effect of aiding the course of national defense while simultaneously encouraging nation building.

2. The Cambodian Military Logistic System

a. The Cambodian Military Logistic System is organized along technical service lines in the form of the old French logistic system with many

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similarities to the pre-1962 U.S. system. This organization allows each Technical Service to maintain a great degree of autonomy. Centralized control of each service is focused in Phnom Penh where each has its own storage facilities. All technical services operate under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Materiel within the Ministry of Defense.

b. Administration and stock record control of supplies received for all services is centralized in the Ministry of Defense. Essentially all requisitions, both incoming from the units and outgoing to the procurement source are processed this one location. For the most part, particularly at Brigade level, each unit at one time or another will draw supplies direct from the Phnom Penh technical services. This direct issue to units, (battalion level) has been used in the U.S. MAP issues of weapons and other ordnance items.

c. This past year has seen more and more concentration of logistic support and control in the city of Phnom Penh. For example, the Louvek Depot complex, constructed under the former U.S. MAP program at a cost of \$3.3 million, has for all intents and purposes been moved to Phnom Penh. When military operations secure this area this depot should assume major importance.

(1) This Maintenance and Supply Depot has the capability of performing 4th echelon automotive maintenance, engine rebuild, tire recapping, forging, specialized machining, heat treating, and other associated tasks. The Louvek Depot is a major national asset that has the physical capacity to: rebuild 1,000, and perform GS maintenance of 2,500 vehicles per year; provide D/S and G/S weapons maintenance support to a force the equivalent of a U.S. field army; store 20,000 S/T of ammunition; and house an Ordnance school. Warehouses in the same area have the capabilities of bin storage for approximately 25,000 line items, major assemblies, tools and weapons. The Louvek Depot, although a prime maintenance and storage facility, is barely operational in any area due to the lack of area security and technically qualified personnel many of whom were used to fill combat units.

(2) This facility also served as the Quartermaster Depot for FANK that included complete repair and storage operations. The shoe factory is the only facility now operating and then only on a very restricted basis. (30-50 pair/week). Unused is a clothing factory, over 14,500 sq ft of warehousing, and a 18,000 gal fuel storage facility. Serving both depots is a 5,900 ft laterite and grass airstrip and an LST unloading site (10 miles distant).

d. In Phnom Penh, Quartermaster facilities consist of:

(1) Storage areas for uniforms, canned rations and raw materials.
(2) A temporary sewing factory, moved from Louvek, primarily used for making mosquito netting and cutting room for cutting out uniforms which are then transported to a civilian firm for sewing together.

e. Civilian factories are the prime source for production of military uniforms. It is reported that they can produce 2,000 pairs of boots and 5,000 uniforms a day, however, actual production is probably significantly

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less.

- (1) The Quartermaster Corps has little representation at the MR level.
- (2) The Quartermaster Corps also serves as the FANK Finance Corps.

f. Signal Corps:

(1) The FANK has a Base Signal Depot located at Ang Snuel, approximately 22 km west of Phnom Penh. The Ang Snuel Depot provides:

- 3rd and 4th echelon Signal Maintenance
- Refrigerated battery storage. (This battery warehouse is probably one of the best in Southeast Asia.)
- A factory producing BA 30 (flashlight batteries) at a rate of about 2,000 p/day.
- Training facilities for communicator operators and repairmen.

(2) Although the Signal Depot is probably one of the best organized and productive facilities in the FANK Logistical Program, it is still greatly hampered by the lack of adequate repair parts, tools, manuals, and proper training devices. The Ang Snuel Depot came under enemy attack on 27 April 1971 and a warehouse containing large quantities of French, Chinese, and U.S. communications equipment was destroyed.

g. Engineer Corps:

(1) The Engineer Depot is located approximately 5 km west of Phnom Penh. This depot was badly damaged during a sapper attack on 22 January 1971 and has not recovered. A large amount of major engineer equipment was destroyed and the repair parts warehouse was completely destroyed.

(2) This attack and destruction did not greatly hinder the FANK construction effort as a whole, since the engineer capabilities were operationally poor at its best. The Bureau of Public Works, as indicated above, performs major engineering missions.

(3) It is the plan of FANK to procure new land and construct a new engineer facility rather than repair the old complex.

h. Medical Corps:

(1) The FANK military has two operational hospitals in the Phnom Penh area. The 701st Evac Hospital and the 101st Evac Hospital. Both hospitals are functioning beyond their peak with casualties and sick bedded in hallways. They are extremely limited as to proper medical equipment, supplies and qualified medical personnel. (An example would be that Cambodia does not have one medically trained orthopedic surgeon available in the military.)

(2) The 701st Evac Hospital will soon be taken over by the Ministry of Education, and it is hopeful that the Monivong Hospital will then be

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reverted to a military hospital. The Monivong Hospital is probably better equipped than either of the military hospitals but still far from meeting a minimum standard.

(3) It is planned to expand the 101st Evac Hospital to a 400 bed capacity.

(4) Virtually every civilian hospital in Cambodia, with the exception of the French "Calmet" Hospital, is used for military wounded and sick.

(5) Each Military Region, with the exception of MR 2, has a small military hospital (approximately 50 beds). The MR 2 hospital was destroyed by the NVA/VC several months ago. Plans are to double the capacity of these field hospitals through MAP funds.

(6) The team observed on the docks at Kompong Som a significant amount of Japanese donated field hospital equipment awaiting movement to Phnom Penh. In addition, some 300 Japanese Red Cross ambulances and pick-up trucks were also in storage in Kompong Som awaiting direction of the High Command to move them to Phnom Penh for distribution throughout Cambodia. The Director of Materiel in the Ministry of Defense was questioned as to moving these vehicles by sea and not waiting for Route #4 to open, he replied that it was a "civilian problem."

i. An Armament Repair Facility is presently in operation in the Phnom Penh area. This facility has 12 highly qualified armament repairmen, moved from Louvek but is greatly hampered due to the lack of additional qualified personnel, proper tools, repair parts and manuals.

j. A temporary automotive repair facility was recently made operational in Phnom Penh. Progress at this facility is slow since they are attempting to repair equipment with antiquated U.S. and Russian tools and manuals. It is expected, that when adequate tools and manuals are made available, this facility will be highly productive. During the interim, maintenance personnel are being sent to RVN for higher level training. This may cause a temporary lag in present production but should greatly improve their future efficiency.

3. Results:

When the logistic system is viewed from the using unit level, it is simply not working with the exception of ammunition deliveries to the Military Region. The delivery of ammunition to the local units is handicapped by the lack of motor transport. Shortages of uniforms, weapons and radio repair personnel and facilities, transportation and fortification material were most prevalent. Most commanders had either no knowledge of how to acquire the support or were of the opinion that it was useless to request support and stated they did not requisition because the "High Command does not have the necessary money and supplies to help."

4. Significant Logistic Problem Areas -

Discussed below on those problem areas that exert a great deal of influence

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on the current combat capability of FANK. In some cases limited corrective action is taking place; however, for the short-term, complete correction is not anticipated. Since ammunition is the single most expensive item contained in the U.S. Military Assistance Program, the problem of ammunition supply in-country is discussed in more detail.

a. Ammunition Supply System

(1) FANK ammunition supply system is very rudimentary and controlled at the highest levels with FANK G4. Requisitions from units are personally signed by the Military Region Commanders. The release orders are personally signed by the FANK G4. FANK has the capability of keeping detail accounting records of ammunition stored at the major depot at Kambol, but lacks the trained personnel to analyze statistical data and to determine and program requirements. The lack of a logistical communication net, coupled with a lack of trained logistical personnel at regional level and supply personnel at unit level, makes it extremely difficult to obtain on a routine basis, stock status reports as to ammunition in the hands of troops and accurate consumption reports. At present, approximately 40% of the units other than those in and around Phnom Penh ammunition units furnish any reports, and these reports are on an irregular basis which tends to lessen their real value.

(2) There is essentially one ammunition depot supporting all of the FANK. This is at Kambol, some 5 km west of the Phnom Penh airfield. There are two small ammunition supply points within Phnom Penh proper which serve as a small emergency reserve of small arms, grenades and mortar ammunition. There is also a small ammunition supply point at three of the Military Region HQ's. The permanent ammo storage facilities at Louvek are not in use as the area is not secure.

(3) Personnel manning the Kambol depot and the supply points at the Military Regions come under the Chief of Ordnance at National Defense level. On hand are approximately 40-50 personnel out of a recommended T/O of 200 for this facility. Additional personnel have been requested but have not been provided.

(4) The two small emergency supply points in Phnom Penh are under the G4. It is hoped that this awkward situation of G4 managing ammunition and Ordnance furnishing personnel will be eliminated upon implementation of the new organization.

(5) FANK is critically short of all technical service personnel, much less trained ammunition personnel. As of 1 May 71, there were but 37 men present for duty at the Kambol depot. This makes it physically impossible to properly store and segregate the ammunition stored there. The personnel are hard pressed to physically receive and issue ammunition. They are to be commended on their ability to maintain as accurate accountability as they do. There is virtually no material handling equipment (MHE) available at the depot other than a crane which is considerably awkward for handling pallets, and one or two old commercial forklifts which are

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available only one or two days a month. There is but one rough terrain forklift in the country that must remain at the airport for the unloading of all cargo including ammunition. The few personnel available at the depot are unskilled in the techniques of stevedoring and material handling. Most of their efforts are wasted because of the lack of training.

(6) Kambol depot is presently under major construction. Seven storage modules are being constructed with a road net and perimeter defense positions. The failure to date of the Ministry of Public Works to provide crush rock for hardstands and the engineers to compact the earth barricades may cause the depot to become a virtual swamp during the monsoon season. This will cause a considerable loss of ammunition due to deterioration and water damage.

(7) This is considered to be an interim measure until such time as FANK can train or have personnel train out of country, and these personnel have had on the job experience. Such detail technical assistance would be required for about a two year period to insure effective operation of the base depot, establishment of sub-depots at the Military Regions, and the establishment of an effective ammunition surveillance program.

(8) A significant amount of ammunition is delivered by air to Phnom Penh airfield where it is unloaded and moved to local storage facilities. Double handling occurs when ammunition is supplied to several of the outlying MRs by air. A system of direct ammunition delivery from RVN stocks to the more distant MRs would not only save time and personnel but would make the system more responsive. Until a valid reporting system for the using unit is established which includes accuracy on-hand stocks and expenditure rate factors it would be difficult to develop this direct delivery system.

b. Incoming Spare Part Identification.

The present systems of requesting spare parts is end-item maintenance oriented with little progress being made in developing the necessary stockage level of spares. The MEDT can receive a request for spare parts from several sources, G4, foreign assistance offices (FAO), Bureau of Logistics or one of the technical services. The problems surface when the requisition is filled and the materiel arrives in-country. At that point the materiel is turned over to the FAO who may or may not (most likely not) have the original request. The part is identified only by Federal Stock Number (FSN). No record is available as to what unit or service ordered the part or what end-item is in need of the part. A detailed search is then required of the rather rudimentary FSN catalogue system recently established. This action attempts to identify the end item and then hopefully the technical service concerned would know the specific item that is non-operational.

c. Motor Transport.

(1) The shortage of motor vehicles not only impacts on the logistic supply system but reduces the mobility of the combat units to near zero.

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To compensate, FANK has commandeered civilian busses and trucks and assigned them to the general reserve type brigades. To a significant degree the absence of a responsive supply system has contributed to what has been called the "hoarding phenomenon." Unit commanders refuse to expend ammunition either for training or by conducting offensive operations since they have little confidence in the responsiveness of the resupply system.

(2) It is now planned to introduce into Cambodia a total of 600 Australian trucks (some 100 have arrived) and 2012 U.S. military vehicles under the FY 1971 MAP and USAID military related purchases. Although the majority of the military vehicles are 2- $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks and $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton jeeps, other support vehicles are included with delivery dates stretching through March 1972. To support this vehicle input, only 81 drivers have completed formal training with an additional 78 driver, 47 vehicle maintenance and 10 stock record control personnel now in training in RVN. Driver training could be accomplished in-country with little problem; however, for the other support required, longer lead time and a more formal approach is required.

(3) Under the reorganization plan discussed in paragraph 6, FANK plans to establish a Transportation Service which will have the same stature as the other technical services which should assist in the allocation of resources and provide to a limited degree better management in the areas of maintenance and supply support for the vehicles.

(4) A word of caution must be presented here without presenting any definitive conclusions. Throughout the country one can observe many vehicles (estimated 500-700), most issued under the former U.S. MAP, in various stages of destruction. From spot mileage checks, it was determined that most vehicles become non-operational earlier than could be reasonably expected with normal care and maintenance. Without proper training throughout the transportation area, it might be reasonable to expect that additional vehicles could follow the same road of deterioration that the past MAP vehicles have followed.

d. Maintenance and Supply:

(1) Maintenance and Supply

(a) Maintenance at any level within the Cambodian Military is well below minimum acceptable standards. There are many contributing factors to this highly deficient area; principal, however, is the fact that during the past ten to fifteen years, Cambodia has received equipment from the United States, Red China, Russia, Japan, and France. They have attempted to combine this wide variety of equipment into their inventory. As can easily be understood, under this situation an effective maintenance standard would be virtually impossible to establish.

(b) The MNK, in all probability, has the best facilities available to the Armed Forces; these are located at the Chruong Chang Naval Base in the Phnom Penh area. Although the large majority of their

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shop equipment is extremely old and of French and Japanese origin, they still remain marginally operational. The Navy maintenance facilities include: an Electrical Shop, Electronic Shop, Machine Shop, Maritime Engine Repair Shop, and Vehicle Repair Shop. If some of the older shop equipment could be updated and a sufficient number of qualified maintenance personnel were made available, the Cambodian Navy Maintenance Facility could be a highly productive asset.

(c) The AVNK has progressed very rapidly in their aircraft maintenance capability during the past year. The arrival of the MAP Contract Maintenance Assistance Team was of great assistance to the Air Force in establishing a sense of urgency and providing guidance to the Cambodians in the Supply and Maintenance areas. A large percentage of the supply and maintenance problems were eliminated on 22 January 1971, when a VC/NVA sapper attack completely destroyed the Russian MIG's and the French Fouga jets. This, then enabled the Cambodians to concentrate their efforts on the T-28, C-47, O-1 aircraft and UH-1 helicopters. The Contract Assistance Team has been able to provide limited training personnel on all aircraft except the UH-1 helicopter.

(d) A training program was established in USARV to train maintenance personnel on the UH-1D helicopter to include the 100 hour phase inspection. This program was completed in February 1971.

(e) All IRAN and battle damaged aircraft are evacuated to either Udorn AFB or Don Muang in Thailand for repair. Turn around time has normally been satisfactory for repair of these aircraft.

(f) Certain problem areas still exist in that most of the maintenance tools on hand are of the metric size and not compatible to U.S. aircraft. Tech Orders and Manuals are critically short. Certain maintenance career fields, such as sheet metal workers and armament specialists are also critical. The Cambodians have also not yet gained a great deal of maintenance experience on the UH-1 helicopter, which will be one of their more vital assets. Maintenance, again is progressing rapidly and when an effective pipeline for repair parts is established, it will improve at a greater rate.

(g) The FANK is probably in the poorest condition in maintenance assets. In addition to a lack of repair manuals, tools, and equipment, repair parts and maintenance facilities, the FANK is critically short in all areas of qualified maintenance personnel. The military has no maintenance personnel of capability for repair on heavy weapons, (e.g., 105 Howitzers), medical equipment, and chemical equipment. Very few qualified personnel are available in the vehicle, small arms communications equipment, quartermaster equipment and engineer construction equipment areas. The RVN has provided some assistance in the heavy weapons area but until such time as maintenance personnel being trained in RVN return and establish their own in-country training program, the maintenance program

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will be marginal. Shown at Tab 1 are those logistic support units that have been activated but are not operational which when they become so will contribute significantly to the overall maintenance effort.

5. Supply Management:

a. The current supply system is cumbersome, time consuming, and costly in manpower. When a unit requires an item, it must submit a letter to the FANK G-4 requesting issue. This letter does not indicate stock number or end item application. If the request appears reasonable, it is approved and sent to the appropriate depot stock control section. If the item is in stock, a release order is issued and it may be picked up from the depot. If the item is not in stock, the request is passed to the FAO.

b. FANK is attempting to develop a formal requisitioning procedure for equipment and supplies whereby using units will make a written request to their higher headquarters and the higher headquarters will then place a formal requisition upon the FANK G-4 for issue or requisition. Although this procedure is relatively new to the Cambodian military, they are very enthusiastic about it, in that it should provide a greater degree of accountability from the higher level down to the user. Several problem areas still exist in this plan: manuals for identification of equipment and repair parts are often not available, the Cambodian supply personnel are not yet familiar with the system, and middle management personnel need to be trained to provide guidance and proper supervision. This is of extreme importance in that the personnel provided to fill supply/logistical billets have had little prior training and in some cases are unable to read and write in any language. (Since most of the manuals they do have are in either French or English, this again emphasizes the desperate need for qualified middle management personnel). These problems create a definite gap in the development of an effective supply system. However, with proper formal training and OJT the problems are not insurmountable.

c. Under a new system proposed by the MEDTC, unit requests will go to the MRLC, and if not filled, to the appropriate depot. If not filled at that level, the depot will order against the FAO on a MEDTC French/English requisition. The FAO will then prepare and submit a prepunched MEDTC-provided requisition to MEDTC, who will then initiate appropriate MILSTRIP supply action.

d. Running spares are non-existent. Until such time as demand data can be established, considerable research will have to be performed to establish stockage levels to support equipment in the Cambodian inventory. Training in this area will have to be accomplished all the way down to the lowest operational unit. This would be a time consuming process even under the most desirable circumstances, but with most of the units being "actively engaged" in combat, the absence of qualified personnel to act as a training cadre and proper training aids and manuals, it is not envisioned that this requirement will materialize for several years. Priority is being given to developing a functional supply system at higher levels and then working down to user units.

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6. Future Plans:

a. In order to overcome some of the problems mentioned in Paragraph 4 above, FANK plans to adopt a logistical system very similar to that found in the RVAF Central Logistical Command. See Tab 2 for the proposed Logistics Organization. In this system the entire logistic structure will come under the G-4 who will be under the operational control of the Bureau of Logistics.

b. Under the Bureau of Logistics, there will be two types of units. The Technical Services with their depots in or near Phnom Penh which will provide wholesale support to the Military Regions and the Military Region Logistical Commands (MRLC's). All of the major supply and maintenance units and other support elements that are not assigned to the MRLC's will be under the FANK Logistics Command located in Phnom Penh. The Logistic Command will also be capable of organizing advance logistic bases when required for special missions or operations.

c. Military Region Logistic Commands. See Tab 3

(1) The MRLC's, although technical service oriented, will be under a single command and will provide full logistics capabilities.

(2) Each of these MRLC's will come under the Bureau of Logistics and will essentially function much in the same way as ARVN Area Logistics Commands. The subordinate detachments of the MRLC's will receive technical support, equipment, personnel, and back-up maintenance services from their parent service. The first MRLC's are scheduled to be formed by the end of FY 71. It is not known what facilities the MRLC's will use. Current data indicates that minimal warehousing is available in the field.

(3) In FY 72 each of these MRLC's will be expanded according to the troop and equipment density in their MR. They will also be provided with contact team capability so that they can provide support for extended combat operations.

(4) Probably the main advantage of this system is that there will be a local logistical commander in each MR to control these detachments and see to it that they are properly supported with repair parts, tools, and trained personnel. Significant also is the fact that the command and control structure will be greatly simplified from that of the present FANK system in which each technical service tries to control all its units all over the nation directly. One negative factor must be considered however, will be the continued absence of a logistical structure below the MR level. The problem remains on the inability of battalion units to grasp the logistic problem and develop any degree of confidence in the system.

d. Foreign Assistance Office (FAO)

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(1) The Foreign Assistance Office centralized in the Ministry of Defense and under operational control of the Bureau of Logistics is responsible for coordinating all foreign military assistance, whether it be U.S. MAP, non-MAP, or third country. All requisitions and work orders are to be received and processed through this office, and each FANK technical service as well as the AVNK and MNK has representatives within this office requesting support and services for his respective units or subordinate units. This office has only been operational for a little over two months but could develop into the primary logistic management element within the armed forces provided the necessary command attention is provided. This is an important step in that now all aid can be processed through a central "clearing house" and allocated where the need is greatest. The FAO is establishing files to indicate the receipt and distribution of major end items as well as specific accounts on MAP-supported units showing authorized and on-hand balances. Since the vast majority of Cambodian war materiel always will come from foreign sources, the FAO will remain as the "lynchpin" of the logistic structure.

7. FANK Logistic versus US MAP

a. Currently a great deal of support is provided to the MEDTC in SVN at no cost to Cambodian MAP. It should be anticipated that as US forces withdraw, particularly USARV elements, more and more responsibility will fall on the MAP program to fund. Consequently an increase in the total MAP may be required. CINCPAC is now developing what the appropriate course of action should be to ensure the continued support of FANK. Areas of concern are:

(1) Warehouse operation - There will be continuing need for 40 to 50,000 square feet of intransit storage for material awaiting shipment to Cambodia. This covered storage facility to include refrigerated storage for batteries (Est 10,000) and secure storage for weapons and material subject to pilferage. Additionally, there is a requirement for about 30,000 square feet of outside storage for vehicles. Informal accounting of receipts and issues, receiving and trans-shipping capability will also be required. USARV is using 9 U.S. and 15 local nationals to accomplish this service at present.

(2) Equipment Processing - A requirement for deprocessing of vehicles, artillery and engineer equipment will continue to increase during FY 72. There are 1700 plus vehicles in the FY 71 Program of which less than 200 have been delivered to date. This requirement includes receiving, intransit storage and preparation for turnover to Cambodia. USARV estimates a composite Direct Support Maintenance platoon of 40 personnel will be required.

(3) Local Haul Transport - A continuing requirement exists for local transport from ports to holding/storage areas. Approximately 10% of incoming Cambodian MAP cargo arrives at one of the aerial ports and has to be picked up and transported to a holding facility pending shipment into country. Also, approximately 25% or 1770 S/T for April was shipped to Cambodia by air - again

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requiring responsive local transport capability. In addition to the local port/depot requirement, TO&E for battalions training at Chi Lang, Dong Ba Thien and Long Hai requires pre-positioning, primarily by surface transport. Although the FY 72 requirement is not firm as to number of camps to be operated, 48 battalions are programmed for equipping and training in SVN. USARV estimates a 40-man truck platoon will be required to provide local haul and camp support service.

(4) Storage/Issue - Lamson - TO&E equipment for all rifle companies trained at Lam Son is currently being handled by U.S. advisor personnel to the ALC at Nha Trang. Material is ordered in and trans-shipped to Nha Trang for issue to Cambodian Rifle Companies as they are activated. It is necessary to assemble and hold this material under U.S. control pending turnover to the Cambodians. This requirement pertained to 100 each 123-man rifle companies in FY 71 and a programmed 132 in FY 72. This requirement is presently being fulfilled by the full time efforts of one U.S. officer and part time assistance of one NCO. Storage and transportation is provided by the ALC.

(5) IRAN of ARVN Excess and KEYSTONE - The MEDT has been directed to accept for the Cambodian MAP, Keystone assets in SCRAM I condition. According to definition, these assets could be in need of organizational maintenance and could well be inoperative. It is obviously counter productive to ship these assets to Cambodia where little or no capability exists for repair. The same applies to ARVN excesses which the MEDT has been directed to accept in the past, the most recent case being the 81mm mortars which required repair and components prior to being ready for issue. No workload estimate has been determined for this requirement pending more definitive data as to quantity and types of assets that may be provided from these sources.

b. COMUSMACV has directed that USARV continue to support MEDT activities until such time as appropriate contracts can be established - estimated through August 1971.

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Military Assistance Plan Logistic Units

The following are the MAP supported logistic units currently programmed to support the Cambodian Armed Forces. MEDT-C reports that all activation are on schedule. However, it must be noted that activation merely means that the unit has been established; individual training, receipt of mission equipment, and finally unit training must all be accomplished prior to these units becoming operationally ready.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Activation Date</u>	<u>O/R Date</u>
Hq Logistics Command	220	June 71	Undetermined
Administration Company	48	*	End FY 71
Ordnance D/S Company	192	April 71	Undetermined
Mdm Spt Ord Bn	409	April 71	Undetermined
EOL Team	10	March 71	Undetermined
Aerial Spt Platoon	33	March 71	Undetermined
Signal D/S Company	100	June 71	Undetermined
Engineer Depot	339	*	End FY 71
Quartermaster Depot	125	*	End FY 71
Ordnance Depot	Undetermined	*	Undetermined
Ammunition Depot	156	*	End FY 71
Transportation Bde	1,500	**	Undetermined
Signal Bde	1,500	Undetermined	Undetermined
Transportation Lt Trk Co	152	Feb 71	***
Military Region Log Catrs (6 ea)	395 ea	****	Undetermined
Ambulance Company	63	May 71	Undetermined
Field Hospital (500 bed)	227	June	Undetermined
MNK Log Spt Sqdn	Undetermined	Undetermined	Undetermined
AVNK Support Group	795	*	FY 71 *****

* Pre-existing unit in some form

** One light truck company activated, four additional light truck companies and one mdm truck detachment scheduled later.

*** Unit has been operating as trucks are received.


**** One 4 Qtr FY 71, one FY 72, four FY 73

***** This unit encompasses all AVNK support. Minimal support is currently being provided by existing assets.

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
FANK LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION



TAB 2

MILITARY REGION LOGISTICS COMMAND

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ANNEX G

ABBREVIATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLAN

CAMBODIA

Background, Objectives, Guidelines,
and Constraints

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ABBREVIATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLAN
CAMBODIA

Background

The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Cambodia had its origin in the small MAAG Indochina established as a result of the Pentilateral Agreement of 23 December 1950, a mutual defense assistance treaty with France and the associated states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The MAAG was established to administer equipment sent to the French (and through the French) to indigenous forces in the area to combat the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. In 1954, following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, MAAG Indochina was split into MAAG Cambodia and MAAG Vietnam.

Subsequent MAP Cambodia was administered on a modest scale. Aid granted during the period 1950-1964 amounted to \$83.2 million. This aid included the provision of 20,000 carbines and 3,000 wheeled vehicles. Part of the equipment remains in use but its condition and distribution are unknown.

From 1960 to 1963, a primary objective of the MAP Cambodia was to strengthen the Cambodian forces against subversion and insurgency. This objective was achieved to a very limited degree through the delivery of substantial amounts of arms, ammunition and equipment; through construction of numerous facilities; through efforts to develop the country's ability to produce basic items of military clothing and to maintain, repair, and rebuild MAP weapons and equipment.

In 1963, Prince Sihanouk renounced U.S. assistance, claiming that the United States was supporting the Khmer Serei movement against the Cambodian government. The MAAG withdrew in December and was formally discontinued in January 1964. No grant aid was programmed in the period FY 64-69. Reasons for failure, in the opinion of the CHMAAG Cambodia, varied from U.S. failure to recognize a smoldering grudge against colonialism and an inability to change Cambodian preference for French training, to a lack of coordination between the MAAG and USAID and a failure to support adequately a commitment to maintain Cambodian independence.

U.S. military assistance resumed on 22 April 1970. Increasing hostile action early in 1970 by the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) caused the Cambodian government to seek aid from not only the U.S. but also South Vietnam and Thailand. The growing enemy threat demanded prompt response and development of a military assistance program.

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Additional assistance has been provided by both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam through delivery of captured weapons and ammunition to Cambodia. This supplemented the same 18,000 individual weapons Cambodia had previously received from Communist China and related sources prior to 1970.

The actual strength of the Cambodian forces in 1960 was estimated to be 28,000, of which 26,000 were Army. The Cambodian forces increased to the MAP authorized 31,000 by the end of 1962. In February 1970, strength of Cambodian Armed Forces (Forces Armees National Khmer - FANK) was estimated to be 35,000 with 1,300 in the Air Force and 1,600 in the Navy. This strength rapidly increased and, as of 30 June 1970, was reported to be over 110,000. On 1 December 1970 the strength of FANK was reported to be 178,000 regular and 35,000 self-defense forces. During April 1971, FANK planned for the reorganization of the Armed Forces and established a mobilization manpower ceiling of 220,000 personnel for FY 72.

Lack of training and poor communications, problems existing in 1964, continued to be matters of concern in 1970. Additionally, rapid buildup of forces was accomplished through mobilization of reservists, enlistment of volunteers and conscription; the introduction of these inexperienced men increased the need for an extensive training program.

Objectives

To provide the Cambodian Armed Forces the capability to sustain national independence and neutrality.

To develop Cambodian Armed Forces sufficiently capable to disrupt NVA/VC base areas and LOC's in Cambodia with a corollary objective of facilitating Vietnamization of the war in South Vietnam.

To encourage and assist Third Country efforts in support of Cambodia.

Guidelines

Assist in the development of an organizational structure for the Cambodian Armed Forces, capable of exerting effective command and control.

Assist the Cambodian Armed Forces in the establishment of a functional maintenance and logistics system to support U.S. furnished equipment.

Assist the Cambodian Armed Forces in developing TOE and tactics compatible with the RVNAF and RTARF.

To maximum extent feasible, phase-out nonsupportable arms and equipment of third country origin and equip selected FANK units with appropriate U.S. manufactured arms.

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Constraints

(For FY 72) Support selected GKR forces, not to exceed 220,000, with critical equipment and supplies unavailable from other sources.

No U.S. military personnel in Cambodia will act in an advisory or training capacity.

Vietnamization continues to be the top priority of U.S. aims in Southeast Asia. Therefore, U.S. assistance for the defense of Cambodia should be compatible with progress in Vietnamization.

Dollar guidelines, annual program:

	(\$ Millions)					
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
MAP	200	275	225	175	125	125
Supply Operations	20	27.5	22.5	17.5	12.5	12.5

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:		21 May 71
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
Attached is one copy of the Military Assessment in Cambodia for your info.		
D / Indochina (Pamphlet) Retain or Destroy		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.		EXTENSION

FORM NO 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)